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THE SUPREME COURT, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
William Lorigan 
November 13, 2013 
This study examined the faiths of select Founding Fathers, the religious context of their time, 
and six Supreme Court decisions concerning religion, to highlight the inconsistencies found 
within the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence covering cases concerning religion.  Through an 
examination of the religious practices of the Founding Fathers, it became evident that their 
views on religion, and how religion should be observed, were as diverse as they were.  An 
examination of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning religion reflects a very 
confusing and inconsistent application of the First Amendment, including the Court’s 
inability to formulate a test that can be consistently applied to cases concerning religion.   
Through the examination of the Founding Fathers and the Supreme Court’s decisions 
concerning religion, it became apparent that the Supreme Court needs to find a way to 
examine religious cases that is consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence and the principles of 
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THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
Today the United States is not the country that the Founding Fathers envisioned. 
From the principles expounded through the signing of the Declaration of Independence 
and the drafting and subsequent ratification of the 1787 Constitution, to the Supreme 
Court’s ruling on United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. (2013), America has undergone 
numerous cultural, social, and economic shifts and changes.  Countless ideas, 
philosophies and practices have fallen by the wayside as the United States has grown in 
population, expanded in size and population diversity, and the federal government has 
increased its influence in political, economic, and social issues, both foreign and 
domestic.  Male and female suffrage has expanded through the efforts of Andrew Jackson 
and the Nineteenth Amendment.  The nation abolished slavery through the ratification of 
the Thirteenth Amendment, and a rising rights consciousness expanded through the 
passage of many acts of Congress, including the 1866 and 1964 Civil Rights Acts.  
Although Congress intended the ratification of the original Bill of Rights to prohibit and 
limit the powers of the federal government on the states only, through the ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, these rights became imposed upon the states through 
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court through the incorporation process.  The 
application of the Bill of Rights upon the states has had both a far-reaching and 
significant effect on many political and cultural spheres previously acknowledged as the 
jurisdiction of the states. 
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  One of the most controversial and compelling issues of legal precedence handed 
down by the Supreme Court to federal, state and local governments through the 
application of the Fourteenth Amendment has been in the area of religion.  The First 
Amendment to the Constitution restricts Congress from making “no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”1  At face value, the 
interpretation and application of this language might seem both straightforward and 
simple, particularly at the time of its drafting.  However, many social, religious and 
political changes have taken place that have clouded and confused not only the meaning 
but the application of this decree.  With the ever changing and evolving pattern of 
American life influencing numerous areas, including suffrage rights and slavery from the 
original intentions of the Founding Fathers, it is reasonable to assume that religious rights 
and freedoms would also be altered by the changing patterns of society and culture.  
However, the question that has thwarted both time and judicial jurisprudence is how to 
apply the principles of the First Amendment while remaining as faithful as possible to the 
intentions of the Founding Fathers?  This thesis asserts that an oversimplified historical 
understanding of the religious views of the Founding Fathers, and inconsistent religious 
jurisprudence concerning the First Amendment’s religion clauses, have made it necessary for 
the Supreme Court to institute a way of examining religious cases that are consistent with its 
own jurisprudence and the principles of the First Amendment. 
Arguments concerning the interpretation and application of the First Amendment 
have been summarized as the “Establishment Clause” and the “Free Exercise Clause.”  
                                                 
1 U.S. Constitution, amend. 1; John Grafton, The Declaration of Independence and Other 
Great Documents of American History 1775-1865 (Mineola: Dover Publications Inc., 
2000), 15.  
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These two terms define the text of the First Amendment which states in part, “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”  But what do each of these two terms mean and, more importantly, how should 
they be applied?  Most advocates who seek to add scholarly or legal weight to these 
questions fall within one of two groups.  According to ex-Attorney General Edwin 
Meese, the first group, known as accommodationists, are advocates of a position that 
believe Congress designed the Establishment Clause to prevent an establishment of a 
“national church,” and from “designating a particular faith or sect . . . above the rest.”2  In 
1985, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist reinforced this position in an opinion he 
delivered in which he claimed the Establishment Clause merely “forbade the 
establishment of a national religion and forbade preference among religious sects or 
denominations.”3  Opponents of this view, known as Separationists, adhere to a strict 
interpretation of the proverbial saying of “separation of church and state,” taken from the 
words of Thomas Jefferson, which seek to keep the church and the state separate in every 
sphere of civic and political life. 
The historical precedence and influence of religion on America’s founding and its 
history is significant.  Christianity constituted one of the three most important and 
influential streams of thought flowing through the colonies from their founding.  
Historian Jeffry H. Morrison described the ideas of “classical republicanism, British 
liberalism, and Protestant Christianity,” as the most common concepts and ideas 
discussed, and then incorporated into the writings and beliefs of most people living 
                                                 
2 Leonard W. Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994), xvii. 
3 Ibid., xvii.  
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through the unsettling and rebellious era of the 1760s and 1770s.4  Both the social elite 
and many of the common folk shared similar writings and beliefs during this time.  This 
enabled their usage to be widely promulgated and understood, whether they were in 
book, pamphlet, newspaper or other printed form.5  However, it was the colony of 
Virginia where religious influence was strongest between the end of the French and 
Indian War in 1763, and the start of the American Revolution in 1775.6   
Historiography 
It was within these tumultuous decades that much of the history concerning the 
role and influence of religion within American culture and its applicability for today 
begins.  Surveying the religious atmosphere of the colonies at the time, many colonies 
had established state sponsored religions like Virginia with the Anglican Church, and 
Massachusetts with the Congregational Church, while other colonies supported or 
endorsed religion through their individual charters and eventually their constitutions.  
These colonies had also promoted statutes that prohibited persons from holding public 
office or voting unless they supported the Christian religion, among other religious 
regulations. 
In his book, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage of 
the First Amendment, historian Thomas J. Curry examined the relationship between the 
church and the state from the founding of the colonies all the way through to the passage 
                                                 
4 Jeffry H. Morrison, The Political Philosophy of George Washington (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press Baltimore, 2009), 4. 
5 Jeffry H. Morrison, “John Witherspoon’s Revolutionary Religions,” in The Founders on 
God and Government, ed. Daniel L. Dreisbach, Mark D. Hall, and Jeffry H. Morrison 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 123. 
6 Ibid., 3. 
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of the First Amendment.  Curry believed that by the eighteenth century toleration of 
religious freedom had become a matter of principle within the colonies.  Colonial writers 
assumed that the legal systems of the time would uphold and maintain a Protestant 
Christian state, and as a natural right be in favor of “absolute liberty of conscience, and 
entire freedom in all religious matters.”7  Curry contends that widespread religious 
diversity had occurred as a result of the Great Awakening, and as a consequence of this 
event the term “establishment of religion” acquired different meanings depending on the 
colony.8  For many colonies, establishment meant following a set of guidelines, while in 
other colonies tax payer funded religion was common.  Colonists became comfortable 
with the religious establishment, as long it was organized and administered by 
themselves.  Colonists saw external “establishment” imposed by England as an 
encroachment on their religious liberties.9  
Led by Virginia, the free exercise of religion, as opposed to the toleration of 
religion, became the benchmark for religious freedom in many southern states.  State 
leaders such as James Madison believed that if the state could force a person to contribute 
to “any one establishment,” then it could compel them to conform to “any other 
establishment,” which would contradict the principle of free exercise.10  New Englanders 
rallied against laws and language that placed one sect or religion above or before another 
while the middle colonies remained unmoved by religious establishment definitions but 
maintained a strong Christian influence.  For many Americans, state religion became 
                                                 
7 Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage of 
the First Amendment (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1986), 78.   
8 Ibid., 104. 
9 Ibid., 133. 
10 Ibid., 78.   
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defined as either the preference of a single religion or the tyrannical intrusion of the 
government into religious affairs.11  By 1789, Americans believed that church and state 
issues had been resolved by individual states, principally because the federal government 
had no power in such matters.  Yet, some groups and individuals still wanted the 
principle stated specifically.12  
In, Church, State, and Original Intent, political scientist Donald L. Drakeman 
believed that as a result of the widespread diversity of understanding concerning church 
and state issues, the “original intent” of the First Amendment should refer to the 
“intentions” of the sovereign parties ratifying the Bill of Rights at the time.13  Drakeman 
believed that the First Amendment religion clauses never stood for the personal 
convictions of the framers or of anyone else; 14 consequently “the early nineteenth-
century Supreme Court spent little time consulting any potential sources of original intent 
or meaning.”15  Drakeman adds that it was not until the framers and ratifiers died out that 
their views started to become more important as the need for the Supreme Court’s 
“arsenal of interpretive approaches began to expand.”16  He believed that arguing what 
was and what was not going on during the drafting and ratifying of the First Amendment 
has led to eighteenth century conversations that did not take place.  This is because the 
views held by the Founding Fathers were as diverse and as varied as the founders 
themselves.    
                                                 
11 Ibid., 191. 
12 Ibid., 194. 
13 Donald L. Drakeman, Church, State, and Original Intent (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 6. 
14 Ibid. 




The question of legal jurisprudence remaining faithful to the Founding Fathers is 
itself subject to debate.  In, God and the Founders, political scientist Vincent Phillip 
Muñoz argues that not every founder of the country viewed religion in the same light, 
contrary to popular belief.  The views of George Washington were inconsistent with 
those of John Adams.  The principles of Roger Sherman were different than those of 
Benjamin Franklin, and as Muñoz emphasizes, even the religious views of James 
Madison and Thomas Jefferson, often linked as kindred spirits, were divergent on 
subjects such as religion and religious liberty.17  Outside of Christianity being the 
dominant faith of those who professed belief in God, denominational practices, regional 
experiences, and personal convictions left every Founding Father with their own personal 
view on religion and how it should be practiced in general.  With no consistent and 
consensus view on religion existing outside of a general agreement on the freedom to 
practice religion, it is impossible for the Supreme Court to formulate an exact standard or 
doctrine for religious legal jurisprudence.  Many historians and conservative social 
commentators, have looked back on the writings, practices and precedents set by the 
Founders as examples of why and how religion should be given free and almost 
unabridged access to all areas of life, both public and private.  Other historians, along 
with more liberal or progressive social commentators, have reached for other writings, 
often by many of the same Founding Fathers, as examples as to why the influence of 
religion should be diminished and in many cases extinguished when religious practices 
and the governmental are involved.         
                                                 
17 Vincent Phillip Muñoz, God and the Founders: Madison, Washington, and Jefferson 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 119. 
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The reason for such a disparity of views is because the Founding Fathers 
constituted a unique and diverse group of individuals.  Following the promulgation of the 
1776 Declaration of Independence, some Founders were killed during the events 
surrounding the American Revolution, while others faded from national prominence.  
Additional Founders rose up in their place when it came time to draft a new Constitution.  
Following the completion of the Constitution in 1787, some Founders excused 
themselves from a prominent place in American history by refusing to sign the final draft 
or leaving federal positions when state governance appeared to be a higher calling.  
While many Founders have faded from the minds of the present, unknown by all except 
those who care for American history or maintain more than a passing interest in historical 
events, other Founding personalities live on almost larger than life.  To this day some 
Founding Fathers cast a long shadow over the cultural and legal direction of the country, 
and in particular the decisions of the Supreme Court.  
 Two of the most widely known and well published figures cited by the Supreme 
Court are James Madison, often touted as the “Father of the Constitution,” and Thomas 
Jefferson, the drafter of the Declaration of Independence.  Muñoz noted that to date 
James Madison has been cited in more than two hundred Supreme Court opinions,18  
while the single most controversial ruling concerning religion by the Supreme Court cites 
the writings of Thomas Jefferson as the cornerstone of its argument.  In Everson v. Board 
of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the justices of the United States Supreme Court split 
their decision five to four.  However, all nine justices agreed that the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause was to be found in the writings of Jefferson and Madison 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 12. 
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concerning the establishment of religious freedom in Virginia.19  Two questions bear 
asking when considering this conclusion by the Supreme Court justices concerning their 
zealous appeal to the writings of Madison and Jefferson in search of religious thought and 
precedence.  First, why have the writings of Madison and Jefferson been given such an 
elevated status concerning church and state issues?  Thirteen colonies existed that were 
all uniquely established, uniquely governed, and uniquely individual in their cultures 
concerning religion prior to and after the ratification of the Constitution in 1787.  Yet the 
thoughts of Madison and Jefferson, who only represented the opinions of Virginia, are 
applied to all thirteen states.  Secondly, Jefferson’s position concerning the relationship 
between the state and the church was outlined in the Virginia Statute for Religious 
Freedom, first drafted in 1777.  However, the strength of the Supreme Court’s argument 
concerning the Establishment Clause was settled on a letter penned by Jefferson in 1802.  
In this letter the weight of the argument concerning separation and the Establishment 
Clause hangs on the phrase, “a wall of separation between church and state;”20 a saying 
that only ever appears once in the writings of Jefferson and never in the Virginia Statute 
for Religious Freedom.21  The Supreme Court needs to reconsider establishing a 
precedent based on a letter written twenty-five after the Constitutional Convention by a 
man who was not present for either the drafting or ratification of the Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights.   
                                                 
19 Ibid., 13. 
20 Ibid., 71. 
21 Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation between Church 
and State (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 54. 
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 In The Establishment Clause, historian Leonard W. Levy suggested that possibly 
the reason the justices have placed so much weight on the words of Jefferson and 
Madison is that Virginia, the home state of both politicians, was the only state from 
which some evidence survives that speaks to the ratification of the First Amendment.22  
Levy believed that the evidence suggested that those debating the First Amendment 
advocated for a wider or Separationists interpretation of the establishment clause.23  Even 
if this position was true, any evidence only represents the thoughts of Virginia, a state 
which was debating ratification under the shadow of their recent divorce from established 
religion in the form of the Anglican Church.  The Anglican Church stood for everything 
many Virginians rejected; a church supported by state funds, a church that oppressed 
other denominations, and a church that as the official state church in England, 
symbolically stood for everything Virginian patriots were fighting against in the 
Revolutionary war.  Any silence by the remaining states, whether through inaction or a 
lack of historical records, does not simply give way to the thoughts and ideas of Virginia.   
Historical evidence exists to support the position of other colonists within the 
other states at the outbreak of the Revolution and the decades following the cessation of 
hostilities.  The leader of the Baptist denomination in Massachusetts, Reverend Isaac 
Backus believed that religious taxes imposed by the state’s legislature were illegal.24  
Backus’ position supports Levy’s argument that the Revolution triggered the 
disestablishment of religion within the states.25  Levy argues that Separationists believed 
                                                 
22 Levy, The Establishment Clause, 111. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 2. 
25 Ibid., 27. 
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the establishment of religion by law hurt both the church and the state.26  Supporting this 
position Levy contended that southern states, particularly South Carolina, looked to 
disestablish state churches.  In his Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious 
Assessments (1785), Madison argued that religion was a private and voluntary affair not 
subject to the state in any way,27 while an unrelated petition to the Virginia state 
legislature also in 1785, advocated for the principle of voluntary support toward the 
church.28  The rationale from both Madison and the Virginia petition was that Christianity 
was most effective when left alone under God “free from the intrusive hand of the civil 
magistrate.”29  These personal opinions, among others, confirm Jefferson and the 
Supreme Court’s wall of separation theory; however, Jefferson himself refutes these 
claims as universally true. 
 Historian Daniel L. Dreisbach in his book, Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of 
Separation between Church and State, argued that it was uncertain whether the wall of 
separation which Jefferson spoke of was located between the state’s right to govern and 
its jurisdiction on religion, or the state’s right to adjudicate between religious opinion and 
religious practices.30   Additionally, Dreisbach suggested that as a matter of federalism, 
Jefferson’s views applied at the federal level and not the state level.31  In keeping with his 
federalist approach it was conceivable that Jefferson had intended that each state would 
erect its own wall principle.32  The First Amendment was about jurisdiction, not religious 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 50. 
27 Ibid., 63. 
28 Ibid., 64. 
29 Ibid., 65. 
30 Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson, 53. 
31 Ibid., 54. 
32 Ibid., 68. 
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liberty.  Drakeman also supported this position contending that Jefferson’s second 
inaugural speech left religion as a state issue.33  It was also probable that Jefferson lifted 
the phrase “separation of church and state” from western political and theological 
literature.  Based on the library of books Jefferson kept, he was familiar with at least one 
or two uses of the phrase and the context in which it was used did not distinguish 
between church and state affairs.34 
The issue of church and state relations seldom came up during the years after the 
ratifying of the 1787 Constitution and the 1791 Bill of Rights.  Regardless of a person’s 
interpretation of the First Amendment, Levy argued that it was agreed upon by the 
delegates of the Constitutional Convention that “the new central government would have 
no power whatever to legislate on the subject of religion,” and that “religion as a subject 
of legislation was reserved exclusively to the states.”35  Occasionally the issue of 
religious liberty did broach public dialogue early in the republic’s history; however, that 
dialogue rarely dealt with the encroachment of religion into the sphere of state or 
government sponsored events.  Early national Americans embraced religion within the 
context of both federal and state governmental proceedings.  Possibly the only judicial 
overlap concerning church and state relations came via the Supreme Court case Barron v. 
Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).  In a decision written by Chief Justice John Marshall, the 
Supreme Court noted that the federal Constitution “was ordained and established by the 
people of the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the 
                                                 
33 Drakeman, Church, State, and Original Intent, 75. 
34 Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson, 82. 
35 Levy, The Establishment Clause, 93. 
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government of the individual states.”36  Succinctly stated, Chief Justice Marshall’s 
rationale was that when “the people of the United States” had ratified the Constitution it 
was to apply to only the government that the Constitution had created - the federal 
government - and “not for the government of the individual states.”37  
Following the 1788 ratification of the Constitution and the 1791 Bill of Rights, 
historian James W. Ely Jr. in, The Guardian of Every Other Freedom: A Constitutional 
History of Property Rights, discussed how the United States began to embark on a course 
that lead to widespread economic prosperity and expansion.  Later conceptualized as 
Manifest Destiny, during this era of prosperity and expansion, property rights consumed 
the majority of the legal proceedings that filled the Supreme Court’s dockets rather than 
religious cases.  Ely explained how legal scholar James Kent’s Commentaries on 
American Law (1826-1830), defined and interpreted American law through this period.38  
Kent observed that “the right to acquire and enjoy property” was among the “absolute 
rights of individuals.”39  Using this rational, Ely contended many judges, including 
Supreme Court Chief Justices Marshall and Roger B. Taney, used property rights “as the 
basis for both ordered liberty and economic development.”40  The Supreme Court used 
the Constitution to emphasize property ownership and corporate enterprise over 
government authority concerning property.  Simply stated, Supreme Court justices 
                                                 
36 Melvin I. Urofsky, Division and Discord: The Supreme Court under Stone and Vinson, 
1941 – 1953 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1997), 6. 
37 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
38 James W. Ely, Jr., The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of 





recognized that respect for property rights constituted the basis of ordered liberty and 
economic development.41  
The free-market economy facilitated the growth of both industrialization and 
urbanization, which also aided the growth of big businesses and corporations.  During 
this time Ely contended that the understanding of property rights had never been fixed.  
Instead property rights evolved over time in response to geographical and economical 
change, urbanization, and industrialization.42  While many people saw property rights as 
a safeguard to economic liberty, political independence, and private enterprise, many 
others began to see economic liberty as a barrier to reforms, income redistribution, and a 
threat to the welfare state.43  The constant flow of new immigrants and laborers to the 
work force in the mid to late 1800s, facilitated industrial economic growth which resulted 
in the concentration of enormous economic power into the hands of a rich few.  This 
concentration of power exacerbated disparities in wealth, and increased the pool of 
middle and lower income workers.  Ely explained that by the beginning of the 1900s, and 
encouraged by the writings and advocacy groups of the progressive movement, 
lawmakers began to shift their focus from the promotion of economic growth to 
economic regulation.44  This new focus led legislators to “redress the unbalanced social 
and economic situation by, in essence, mandating a redistribution of property in favor of 
those viewed as disadvantaged.”45  Legislating social change aroused the ire and hostility 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 8. 
43 Ibid., 5. 




of conservative judges, “resulting in a bitter and prolonged controversy over the 
constitutional position of property rights.”46 
For historical precedence conservative judges continued the long-standing 
Federalists position of using the Constitution as a safeguard for property.47  Ely explained 
that their justification for supporting this position was the fact that the Constitution did 
not grant Congress the right to tax, and it also placed limits on federal governance over 
property and trade.  The Founding Fathers used the Constitution as a mechanism against 
the regulation of property and wealth redistribution, a position up until that point the 
judiciary branch was willing to support.48  Although its potential was not realized at the 
time, it was the ratification of the 1868 Fourteenth Amendment that opened the 
possibility for federal supervision of state legislation, and encroachment upon some areas 
of property rights.   However, the Supreme Court still struck down redistribution and 
class legislation; thus, reinforcing the Framers thoughts concerning property and 
economics. 
 During the Progressive Era reforms inside and outside the legal system nudged 
the Supreme Court into an era of transition.  Ely suggested that many American saw these 
reforms as the foundations of the civil liberties era to come, though at the time they were 
largely symbolic because they produced little tangible results.  Within the Supreme 
Court, Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. proposed the philosophy of judicial 
restraint; that is the Court should defer to “the right of a majority to embody their 
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., 57. 
48 Ibid., 58. 
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opinions in law.”49  Underpinning this philosophy was Holmes’ skepticism towards 
“absolute legal values,” instead preferring the practice of exercising a wide latitude for 
political resolutions.50  Outside of the Court, Progressives sought to “weaken the aura of 
sanctity surrounding the United States Constitution and Supreme Court.”51  Progressive 
leaders latched onto Holmes’ concept of judicial restraint while also maintaining that the 
Supreme Court should no longer “review the reasonableness of economic and social 
legislation.”52  Additionally, Progressives floated the suggestion of amending the 
Constitution to allow for the popular election of judges and judicial recall; but, the idea 
proved unsuccessful.  
 In Division and Discord: The Supreme Court under Stone and Vinson, historian 
Melvin I. Urofsky identified the first official shift towards civil rights and civil liberties 
in the legal jurisprudence of the 1920s when the Supreme Court began dealing with cases 
involving individual liberties.53  Initially the Court reaffirmed through, Prudential 
Insurance Company v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922), the Barron decision of 1833, that 
individual liberties applied only to the federal government.54  However, a mere three 
years later Associate Justice Edward T. Sanford noted in the opinion of the Court for 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), that the First Amendment right to freedom of 
speech applied to the states as well as the federal government.55  The Supreme Court 
reaffirmed this opinion six years later when the freedom of the press clause was also 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 108. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., 122. 
52 Ibid., 123. 
53 Urofsky, Division, 6. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 85. 
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applied in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).56  Urofsky stated that these two cases 
provided the basis for the legal doctrine known as “incorporation,” by which the 
Fourteenth Amendment “incorporated” the liberties protected in the Bill of Rights 
through due process, and applied them to the states.57  The application of the freedom of 
speech and press clauses to the states raised an important question; did the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantee the incorporation of every right found within the Bill of Rights 
and apply them to the states?  Urofsky suggested that this question was answered in 1937, 
when Associate Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo delivered the majority opinion in 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).58  The Palko decision affirmed that all the 
protections of the First Amendment did in fact apply to the states; however, the Second 
through Eighth Amendments should only be applied by the Court when “the very essence 
of a scheme of ordered liberty” was “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental.”59  One explanation proposed to define whether 
something threatened ordered liberty was if it was “so acute and so shocking that our 
polity will not bear it.”60  This approach became known as “selective incorporation,” and 
also implied for the first time that cases would be tried away from “absolute legal 
values.” 
 While no ambiguity existed within the Supreme Court’s determination that all of 
the protections of the First Amendment did apply to the states, the doctrine of selective 
incorporation provided a lot of freedom of choice to the justices when deciding which 
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 7. 
58 Ibid., 85. 
59 Ibid., 6. 
60 Ibid., 86. 
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amendments or portions of the Second through Eighth Amendments applied against the 
states.  Consequently, Urofsky suggested that the doctrine of selective incorporation 
provided “enormous power and discretion” to the courts and the justices.61  He defended 
this position by pointing out that nothing exists in the Constitution that provides any 
guidance or direction about how to apply these rights.62  Instead, judges had to 
“modernize” the Bill of Rights and decide how each of these rights were to be applied 
based on history and precedence.63  Such opinions opened the Supreme Court up to ruling 
on issues that Justice Holmes had described as “the right of the majority.”64  Even more 
critical than Urofsky, Drakeman contended that the incorporation doctrine improperly 
imposed the Establishment Clause on the states via a “judicial revolution.”65  Drakeman 
supported this position by arguing that incorporation reverses the positions not only of 
Congress, but of “forty-three judges of the Supreme Court [who] had passed on the scope 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in a period of seventy years.66 
The Constitutional Revolution of 1937  
The jump from absolute legal values to the right of the majority to embody their 
opinions in law was not nearly as neat as applying the Bill of Rights to the states by way 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Ultimately, a shift in the role of shaping judicial rule and 
reform by the Supreme Court can be traced to many contributing factors, including the 
apprenticeships for lawyers and progressivism throughout the early twentieth century, 
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and most obviously the Great Depression.67  The onset of the Great Depression magnified 
the argument that the unregulated and uncontrolled free market was not functioning well 
in an industrial society.  If the Great Depression exemplified anything it was the 
downward plight of the middle class and poor, often at the hands of big businesses, and 
the distinct lack of protection afforded to them through the legislative and legal process.  
In order to remedy the problems of the Great Depression, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and Congress enacted a series of legislative initiatives known as The New 
Deal.   
Unfortunately for Roosevelt, in 1935 and 1936, while finding “no basis for the 
claim made by some members of the Court that something in the Constitution [had] 
compelled them regretfully to thwart the will of the people,”68 the Supreme Court struck 
down much of his legislative agenda.  During Roosevelt’s first term as President he was 
not afforded the opportunity to appoint any justices to the Supreme Court sympathetic to 
his legislative agenda. Consequently, following re-election in 1936, Roosevelt proposed a 
bill that attempted to enlarge the size of the Supreme Court.  This bill became known as 
Roosevelt’s infamous court packing plan.69  Roosevelt attempted to “pack the court” in 
order to accommodate for what he considered as the Court not acting as a judicial body.  
Instead, Roosevelt saw the Supreme Court as a “policy-making body that had improperly 
set itself up as a third House of Congress – a super-legislature . . . reading into the 
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Constitution words and implications which are not there, and which were never intended 
to be there.”70   
Despite his electoral success many people, including supporters of Roosevelt, felt 
that he had over-reached with his court packing plan.  While having to abandon the plan, 
Roosevelt’s threat to pack the court did have some unforeseen and welcome side-effects, 
which collectively would become known as the “Constitutional Revolution of 1937.”71  
Under mounting political pressure and following Roosevelt’s court packing threat some 
justices shifted their positions concerning the New Deal’s economic and social agenda.72   
Another effect on the Supreme Court surrounding the Constitutional Revolution 
of 1937, was the changing application of the words conservative and liberal.  Prior to the 
Court revolution, “conservative judges imposed their views of property on the law in 
order to thwart economic reform, while liberals advocated judicial restraint.”73  However, 
from this period up until the Warren Court, conservative judges exercised judicial 
restraint “to avoid clashing with the legislature and executive over issues affecting 
individual liberties,” while liberals advocated judicial activism to oppose the political 
branches in order to “protect civil rights and civil liberties.”74 
In 1937, the court abandoned its historic role as protector of property rights, 
leaving them to the federal and state governments to administer.  The following year the 
Supreme Court redirected its focus by separating property rights from personal freedoms 
through the majority opinion by Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone in Footnote Number Four 
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of United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).  Urofsky 
described this footnote as the lynchpin in the way the Supreme Court took and ruled on 
cases as it looked forward to the future.75  He observed that “economic legislation would 
henceforth receive a minimal level of scrutiny . . . so long as the legislature had the power 
and a reasonable justification for its use, courts would not question the wisdom of that 
legislature.”76  However, when statutes began to encroach upon a person’s individual 
rights, “there would be a much higher standard of review.”77  Additionally, the Court’s 
efforts to flesh out exactly how Stone’s footnote would apply brought forth the 
opportunity to reexamine the rationale behind church and state constitutional challenges, 
a void that would be filled by Associate Justice Hugo Black through the words of 
Thomas Jefferson.    
The central argument behind the Carolene Products case concerned itself with a 
federal law which prohibited the interstate transportation of “filled milk.”  Urofsky points 
out that the legislation in question was easily upheld; however, Stone’s majority opinion 
crafted what has since become the most famous footnote in Supreme Court history.  
Through his footnote, Stone established the foundation for “separate criteria in which to 
evaluate legislation embodying economic policy and laws that affected civil liberties.”78  
Laws that affected civil liberties would be described by Stone as being “subjected to 
more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment than are most other types of legislation.”79  Additionally, Stone emphasized 
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statutes that dealt with religious, national, or racial minorities, and that prejudice against 
“discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition . . . which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”80 
Associate Justices Hugo Black and Felix Frankfurter 
President Roosevelt’s unparalleled tenure as President of the United States 
afforded him the opportunity to appoint more justices to the Supreme Court than any 
other president outside of President Washington, who established the first Supreme 
Court.  It was two of Roosevelt’s first three appointments that historian Jeffery D. 
Hockett in New Deal Justice, argued had the greatest bearing on debate surrounding 
incorporation and the precedence that would be set.  Hockett describes the appointments 
of Hugo L. Black (1937), and Felix Frankfurter (1939), by President Roosevelt as 
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court as his “most conspicuous appointees.”81  
Urofsky affirms Hockett’s assessment noting that the personalities of Justices Black and 
Frankfurter “delineated the jurisprudence debates, laid out the key arguments regarding 
incorporation, the proper role of the courts, the limits of the constitutional protection, and 
the meaning of due process and equal rights.”82 
Though the nominees themselves did not agree with all of President Roosevelt’s 
legislative methods, they did provide varying degrees of support towards the intentions of 
the president’s goals.83  However, an unforeseen byproduct of Roosevelt’s selection 
process for choosing candidates to fill the vacancies on the Supreme Court, was the 
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relative lack of harmony concerning legal jurisprudence.84  As a result of this lack of 
harmony and the need to “modernize” the Bill of Rights, constitutional interpretation, 
which in the past had been the relatively easy job of interpreting legal language and 
following precedence proceeding from absolute legal values, became subject to the will 
of those making the judicial decisions.85  Hockett describes this shift away from 
traditional legal jurisprudence by noting that the “traditional view of judicial decision 
making did not survive the assaults that the Progressive jurists initiated and the legal 
realists of the 1930s expanded.”86  
It was while considering the arguments of Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 
(1940), that Black determined that the Fourteenth Amendment did in fact incorporate the 
Amendments One through Eight to the Bill of Rights, and applied them to the states.87  
Black’s detailed reading of history led him to believe that the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment had intended to apply all of the Bill of Rights to the states.88  This 
conclusion contradicted Black’s previous position concerning the earlier Palko decision, 
and put him directly at odds with Frankfurter concerning selective incorporation.  
Through his own analysis and historical research, Justice Frankfurter had determined that 
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had not intended to “subsume all of the Bill of 
Rights.”89 
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By 1941, the criteria for which individual rights applied to the states had not been 
articulated,90 and many rights cases that had come up had taken a back seat due to war 
issues.91  Despite the Carolene Products footnote the Supreme Court was slow to press 
forward with civil rights and civil liberties, in large part due to World War Two.  First 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), and then Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944), seemed primed as opportunities to showcase the Supreme Court’s 
recent change in direction towards civil rights and liberties.  Unfortunately, to the 
disappointment of Gordon Hirabayashi, Mitsuye Endo, and the American Civil Liberties 
Union, this proved untrue.  Although the circumstances surrounding both cases were 
debated in chambers, the Supreme Court found in favor of the defendant both times, 
citing the military’s actions as both a necessary and legal means to achieve an end.  
Given the circumstances surrounding the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the declaration 
of war, and then the huge national undertaking involved in fighting a global war on two 
fronts, the Court felt that the federal government and by extension the United States 
military were justified in their actions.   
While historian Alpheus Mason commends Chief Justice Stone for not sacrificing 
more individual liberties because of military necessities during World War Two,92 
historian John Frank was less forthcoming with praise, citing “the dominant lesson of our 
history in the relation of the judiciary to repression is that the courts love liberty most 
when it is under pressure least.”93  Urofsky also conceded that many of the justices who 
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later developed strong reputations as staunch defenders of individual liberties, were more 
than willing to “look the other way” when the government invoked military necessity 
when making such decisions.94   
Wartime consensus on decisions did not mean peaceful interactions on the 
Supreme Court behind closed doors.  By the spring of 1946, Justice Frankfurter would 
end up defining the sharp personality clashes and general Court dysfunction through three 
observations.  According to Frankfurter, never before in the history of the Supreme Court 
had so many of its members reached “decisions by considerations extraneous to the legal 
issues that supposedly control decisions.”95  Additionally, Frankfurter believed that never 
before had so many members of the Court “acted contrary to their convictions,” and had 
“so large a proportion of the opinions fallen short of requisite professional standards.”96  
It would be a Court decision that many felt fell short of “requisite professional standards” 
that gained the Supreme Court notoriety the next year. 
As a part of his concurrence with the majority decision in Adamson v. California, 
332 U.S. 46 (1947), Frankfurter observed that it was not the Supreme Court’s 
responsibility to impose all of the rights found in the Bill of Rights.  Instead, the Court 
should ask the question, have “the criminal proceedings which resulted in conviction 
deprived the accused of the due process of law?”97  Frankfurter believed that the 
“standards of justice are not authoritatively formulated anywhere,” but “neither does the 
application of the Due Process Clauses imply that judges are wholly at large.”98  
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Frankfurter summarized his position of selective incorporation by explaining that “the 
judicial judgment in applying the Due Process Clause must move within the limits of 
accepted notions of justice and not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely 
personal judgment.”99  Frankfurter saw judging as a moving target rather than a stationary 
or fixed position from which to rule from.  Urofsky described Frankfurter’s philosophy 
behind this rational as allowing judges to “yield the right answer – not an objective, 
eternally fixed answer, but the right answer for the time.”100  Frankfurter did not see his 
position as moral relativism but providing judges the opportunity to “reflect the advances 
that society has made, so that the Due Process Clause does not mean fairness in terms of 
1868 but fairness today.”101  
On the other hand, Black saw danger in leaving the law and the Constitution at the 
educated whim of the justices on the Supreme Court.  For Black, at least total 
incorporation no longer left the definition of what rights met the “canons of decency and 
fairness” to the subjectivity of judges.102   Black even went one step further, determining 
that not only had the Fourteenth Amendment intended to apply the Bill of Rights to all 
the states, but declared that Chief Justice John Marshall had “been wrong in ruling that 
[the Bill of Rights] did not” apply to the states.103  Black’s greatest contention was that if 
Supreme Court judges could strike down random state laws that they believed failed to 
meet “civilized standards,” then constitutional law became the Court’s view of 
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“civilization” at any given moment.104  Black felt so strongly about “total incorporation” 
that he described his dissent in Adamson as the most important opinion of his career.105  
Neither Black’s nor Frankfurter’s approach were without flaws.  While 
Frankfurter’s approach forced legal jurisprudence to become vulnerable to subjective 
evaluation, Black’s approach did not do away with subjectivity either, because Black’s 
“rigid adherence to the text led to a cramped view of individual liberty.”106  Black and 
Frankfurter’s sharp disagreements concerning the application of the Bill of Rights made 
one conclusion obvious.  When two justices can view the same historical evidence, hear 
the same arguments, draw opposing conclusions, and even disagree with the legal 
jurisprudence, the weight of personal preference and personal opinion decided rulings.  
Black’s concern for the ever increasing amount of personal opinion and preference, as 
well as the need to modernize the Bill of Rights led to his landmark majority opinion in 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).  
Everson v. Board of Education 
Historian Sarah Barringer Gordon in her book, The Spirit of the Law: Religious 
Voices and the Constitution in Modern America, observed that the first time the Supreme 
Court applied the Establishment Clause was the Everson decision.107  The Palko decision 
had already established that all the protections of the First Amendment, including the 
Establishment and Separation Clauses, applied to the states.  The Court established this 
application even though it was the intent of the Framers, and then later upheld by Chief 
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Justice Marshall and the Supreme Court through the Barron decision, that the restraints 
of the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government.   
Everson was a bare majority ruling in favor of the minority plaintiffs, and it fell to 
Justice Black to draft the majority opinion.  This opinion became the basis for widespread 
ridicule, an opinion that Gordon describes as an “object of criticism, even derision.”108  
The most controversial aspect of this decision was not the ruling itself but the way in 
which Justice Black framed the opinion.  In justifying his opinion, Black invoked 
Thomas Jefferson as a source for understanding constitutional text.109  Drawing on 
Jefferson’s legacy as a Virginia state legislator, his foundational role in the 
disestablishment of religion in that state, and a prominent supporter behind the movement 
for the adoption of the Bill of Rights, Black used Jefferson to tie the Founding Fathers to 
his opinion in Everson.  Black felt that the function of the judicial branch should be the 
same as that of the legislative branch, “to protect society’s weakest members from 
political and economic exploitation.”110  Through his opinion in the Everson ruling Black 
fell in line with his jurisprudence, but his history did not. 
Two main issues exist that make Everson so controversial.  The first is the 
rationale behind Black’s opinion.  As Urofsky stated, “Black went on to write a brilliant 
exposition of the historical forces that had led to the adoption of the First Amendment, 
and his opinion leads the reader to expect him to uphold the New Jersey statute 
constitutional,” and then he upholds the opposing position.111   In his opinion, while 
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writing his definition of the Establishment Clause, Black explained that, “the 
establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment . . . in the words of Jefferson . . . 
was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and state.’”112  In concluding 
his opinion Black reaffirmed his previous position stating that, “The First Amendment 
has erected a wall between church and state.  That wall must be kept high and 
impregnable.  We could not approve the slightest breach.”113  For the duration of his 
opinion Black proved everything that he was trying not to say.  Urofsky described it as, 
“Black, after marshaling every argument in favor of a total separation of church from 
state, weakly allowed that no breach of the wall had occurred.”114   
The second issue was Black’s appeal to Thomas Jefferson as his link back to the 
Founding Fathers.  In doing so, through the eyes of conservative and religious activists, 
Black made two fundamental mistakes.  The first was that Jefferson is not a great source 
for understanding the “constitutional text.”  In previous rulings, Black had pointed to the 
intent of the framers as support for his decisions and chastised fellow justices for 
“engaging in constitutional revision.”115  The irony being that despite being an advocate 
for the intentions of the Framers, Black’s watershed opinion was made via the words of a 
Founding Father who was not a framer of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights.  
Secondly, the justification for his definition of the Establishment Clause is not a reference 
to any state legislation, but a subjective personal letter between Jefferson and the 
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Danbury Baptist Church.  Drakeman contends that Black, “simply used mandates from 
historical records or sought out and used facts that justified [a] case he had already pre-
decided,”116 describing Black as the “Supreme Court’s chief practitioner of law office 
history.”117 
Both the context of the letter to the Danbury Baptists and the meaning of the wall 
separating church and state have come under more and more scrutiny over time. Both 
religious and secular proponents alike have been jostling for leverage and relief 
concerning the exact meaning and definition of this statement.  At face value what Justice 
Black and the Supreme Court’s intentions were concerning these words, as well as the 
intentions of the Founding Fathers, remains unclear.  The exact meaning of the wall 
became clearer when Justice Black expounded that this separation must be “kept high and 
impregnable.  We could not approve the slightest breach.”  Yet the Everson opinion from 
the outset created more confusion, accusations, and misunderstandings concerning what 
the Supreme Court meant and how its ruling should be enforced when considering issues 
of religion.   
In Religious Freedom and the Constitution, Provost of Princeton University 
Christopher L. Eisgruber and law professor Lawrence G. Sager explained that the high, 
impregnable, and un-breachable wall was failing to serve the Court as needed.  Eisgruber 
and Sager believed that the metaphor “can never provide a sensible conceptual apparatus 
for the analysis of religious liberty,”118 since in practical reality the wall should be “raised 
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in some places and lowered in others.  Or that it should have holes in it.”119  Ultimately 
though, they came to the conclusion that the Supreme Court’s definition needed to be 
restated. 
Like many others, Eisgruber and Sager believed the fundamental problem with 
constitutional rulings concerning religious issues was that they are somewhat arbitrary, 
occasionally inconsistent, but they do not follow a clear or distinguishable line of reason 
or principle.  According to Eisgruber and Sager, the idea or possibility of true separation 
needed to be removed from people’s understanding of religion and government.  Instead, 
they believed that true separation is a misleading perception and expectation in light of 
how much the state and religion are entwined.  Levy further emphasizes this idea 
pointing out that “the Establishment Clause, like any other controversial clause of the 
Constitution, is sufficiently ambiguous in language and history to allow few sure 
generalizations.”120  Levy further adds that “no scholar or judge of intellectual rectitude 
should answer establishment-clause questions as if the historical evidence permits 
complete certainty.”121 
Eisgruber and Sager believed that the idea of “Equal Liberty” provided the best 
possible alternative to evaluate church and state relations easily, without having to take 
into account perceived biases either for or against religious petitions.  Equal liberty meant 
replacing the concept of separation when dealing with church and state issues from the 
public lexicon, and replacing it with the use of the term equal liberty.  Equal liberty 
sought to offer “fair terms” which guaranteed that a person’s religious needs would be 
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accommodated on the same terms as comparably nonreligious needs.  While equal liberty 
may have seemed prudent and even practical, the phrase fell short of its intended goal 
because it ultimately did not resolve the root issue of the problem, the unique position the 
Constitution affords religion over other liberties.    Replacing the arbitrary wall of 
separation with equal liberty may provide a sharper, distinct and more pragmatic 
understanding of church and state issues, while also helping to solve some problems; yet, 
it may in turn, also created new ones.      
According to the First Amendment of the Constitution, “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  
Equal liberty would have also moved against the tide of current First Amendment 
jurisprudence which has sought to protect the rights, and in many cases the practices of 
religious groups.  Unfortunately for Eisgruber and Sager, the Constitution does not 
protect the establishment and free exercise of nonreligious convictions, unlike religious 
convictions which are protected.   
Religious organizations and people rely on the state for both opportunities and 
protection.  To try and separate them is both foolish and impossible.  The whole point of 
having religious freedoms and rights protected by the Constitution is because the 
Founding Fathers, regardless of their opinions on religion, knew that the needs of religion 
are unique and separate from those of other institutions and individuals.  Another 
problem Urofsky points out is that by protecting the rights of those who do not believe in 
the use of religion in civic events, are not the courts “treading on the right of those who 
continue to believe that religion plays a necessary and legitimate role in civic society?”122  
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Religion is far more intertwined in American culture than Black’s Everson ruling 
suggests.  The Founding Fathers and American presidents have petitioned to God 
throughout American history.  It is to God as “the Supreme Judge of the world” that 
Thomas Jefferson appealed the just intentions of the “Representatives of the United 
States of America” in the Declaration of Independence.123  Jefferson also appealed to God 
when he declared that all men are created equal, “endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights” of which are “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”124  Finally, 
it is to God again that Jefferson looked for support of the Declaration, and to “divine 
Providence” that Jefferson and his contemporaries would mutually pledge to each other 
“our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.”125  It would be four score and seven 
years later, after the horrendous bloodbath at the Battle of Gettysburg, that President 
Abraham Lincoln would give his famous Gettysburg Address.  In this address on 
November 19, 1863, Lincoln, while invoking the previous work of the Founding Fathers, 
would pledge to those around and future generations that America “under God” would 
provide “a new birth of freedom and that government of the people, by the people, for the 
people, shall not perish from the earth.”126  Finally, it was President Roosevelt who in 
1944, a mere three years before the Everson ruling, would call “the Nation into a single 
day of special prayer” to “Almighty God.”127  On June 6, 1944, a day of national 
trepidation brought on by the invasion of Normandy, France, during World War Two, 
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Roosevelt would ask “Almighty God . . . to preserve . . . our religion,” asking the people 
of the United States to “let words of prayer be on our lips, invoking Thy help to our 
efforts.”128  Roosevelt would also ask “Lord, give us Faith. Give us Faith in Thee,” and 
concluded with the solemn request, “Thy will be done, Almighty God.  Amen.”129    
 Religion has played a far more prominent role in America’s history, and 
influenced American society than the arbitrary delineation that a “high and impregnable” 
wall of separation between church and state suggests.  From the father of “separation” 
Thomas Jefferson, to Abraham Lincoln to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, prominent men of 
historical importance as well as common citizens, have all called on God and invoked the 
weight of God’s name and stature to support their opinions.  The historical influence of 
religion cannot be denied; however, its universal appeal certainly cannot be agreed upon 
either.     
In 1953, Justice Frankfurter when asking the other Supreme Court justices to 
consider the civil rights cases before them, requested that they address, among others, the 
following question: What was the “congressional intent in the drafting of the Civil War 
amendments?”130  When discussing cases concerning religion, the Court should also 
consider the congressional intent of the drafters of the First Amendment.  In asking this 
question two conclusions are likely to be reached.  First, it will become obvious that no 
single solution or universal answer to what the Founding Fathers meant existed when 
they crafted the First Amendment.  As Levy points out, “the framers and the people of the 
United States, whose state legislatures ratified the clause, probably did not share a single 
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understanding” concerning the exact meaning of the First Amendment.131  Secondly, it 
will be equally obvious that a “wall of separation between church and state” was not the 
congressional intent of the Founding Fathers either.  Again Levy weighed the argument 
concluding that “scholars and judges who present an interpretation as the one and only 
historical truth, the whole historical truth, and nothing but the historical truth delude 
themselves and their readers.”132  As Dreisbach contended, the Supreme Court’s 
elevation of the saying “separation of church and state” to a virtual rule of constitutional 
law neglected the historical context of the saying.133  He further speculates that the debate 
surrounding church and state may not be any different if the wall had not been 
introduced, but it might have “created a more honest debate; instead ‘wall’ ceased any 
critical analysis and reevaluations.”134 
After the work of the Founding Fathers establishing the country, property rights 
became the single biggest legislative and legal issue for a century.  Through the Industrial 
Revolution and then the Great Depression, the legal stage was set concerning the shift 
from property rights, to individual liberties, and in particular those concerning minority 
groups.  The Palko opinion laid the foundation for incorporation while the Carolene 
Products footnote signaled the Court’s shift in focus.  For the Stone Court, the onset of 
World War Two would result in a brief hiatus as both the United States military and the 
federal government sought to strengthen America’s fighting position from the inside and 
out.  At the conclusion of the war the postwar agenda became dominated by the views 
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and opinions of both Justices Black and Frankfurter.  Such views would be based on 
personal subjectivity as much as legal jurisprudence.  It would be Black who would leave 
the longest lasting legacy concerning the state and religion with his Everson opinion.  
Mocked and derided from the outset, Everson has since become one of the most quoted 
and misunderstood opinions in Supreme Court history.  Inconsistent religious 
jurisprudence and an oversimplified historical understanding of the religious views of the 











RELIGION AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 
 
Unlike any other clause within the Constitution since its ratification, the First 
Amendment clause concerning the establishment and free exercise of religion has 
garnered more debate, disagreement, controversy, and division than any other piece of 
literature left by the Founding Fathers.  Historians, including both Leonard Levy and 
Daniel Dreisbach, agree that attaching a single understanding to the Establishment and 
Free Exercise clauses of the Constitution, like the Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U.S. 1 (1947), decision did, is both neglectful and delusional.1  Even more astonishing is 
that the United States Supreme Court itself has stated through the words of Associate 
Justice John Rutledge that “no provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or 
given context by its generating history than the religious clause of the First Amendment.  
It is at once the refined product and the terse summation of that history.”2  Given that 
both historians and Supreme Court justices alike agree that the historical context is both 
important and fundamental to understanding the meaning of the Establishment and 
Separation Clauses, it is wise to examine both the historical context surrounding the 
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revolutionary era, the early years of federal governance, as well as any personal opinions 
that can be gleaned through the writings and correspondence of the Founding Fathers 
themselves.  In doing so it may be possible to gain a more holistic understanding of what 
the intentions and limitations of the religious clauses of the First Amendment were for 
that generation.   
 The historical legacy of religion in American history is long and complicated.  
These historical complications are due to the diversity of denominations established 
throughout the different colonies as well as the varying degrees of political influence they 
welded over time.  Additionally, individual colonists, including the Founding Fathers, 
each professed and practiced their religious beliefs in a multitude of different ways.  
Consequently, it has been impossible for historians to illustrate the religious climate 
throughout the colonies, and the individual states, in one sweeping characterization.  
Unlike historians, the United States Supreme Court defined the religious atmosphere and 
opinions of the late eighteenth century.  Through the Everson decision the Supreme Court 
provided a template by which it could decide subsequent decisions concerning religion.  
The Everson template defined the First Amendment religion clauses by establishing the 
separation of church and state through a “high, impregnable, and un-breachable wall.”3  
Despite the Everson decision, however, the Court has been unable to decide religion 
cases by applying a simple rubric.  Such an application has been impossible because of 
the girth of historical evidence, including the writings and religious convictions of the 
Founding Fathers, historical documentation, and the diverse opinions of the colonists 
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themselves, all of which have compounded the Court’s inability to provide clear, 
consistent, and accurate decisions.   
 Religion within the American colonies of the mid to late eighteenth century was a 
tapestry of traditional religious practices established since the founding of the colonies, 
infused with the constant influx of new religions and denominations as more immigrants 
arrived from Europe.  By the seventeenth century the marriage between church and state 
had been established with many colonies requiring taxpayers to pay taxes in support of 
the local church.4  Although the practice was the same, the churches or denominations 
receiving support varied from region to region.  In Virginia colonists supported an 
established church, the Church of England, while in New England colonists provided 
support to the Congregationalist Church.  In addition to state sponsorship, various 
appointments to public office required at minimum an affirmation of faith while other 
colonies required the passing of a religious test.  The first real challenge to these centuries 
old European practices was the religious explosion that came to be known as the First 
Great Awakening during the 1730s and 1740s.   
The First Great Awakening destroyed any preconceived ideas of establishment 
understood throughout all the colonies by the early settlers.  This religious awakening 
effected many colonists disassociated with or discouraged by the many preexisting large 
denominations, in particular the Church of England.  As a consequence, many of these 
new religious converts sought validation for both their experiences and their beliefs.  
When old churches could not or would not cater to the needs of these new believers, 
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colonists formed new churches.5  Many new and marginal Christian denominations began 
to form such as the Baptist and Methodists, and then saw their ranks swell with numbers.  
Accordingly, by the middle of the eighteenth century, the term “establishment of 
religion” meant little more than public financial support and civic preference for one 
denomination.6 
The Great Awakening itself was short-lived, being over by the late 1740s, with 
the notable exception of Virginia.  Within Virginia the Awakening persisted into the 
1760s and 1770s, where it exerted significant influence surrounding both the politics and 
the rhetoric leading up to the American Revolution.7  In order to cater to and take 
advantage of this religious persistence much of the political literature of the 1760s and 
1770s was either written by clergy or emphasized religious themes.8  Following the 
outbreak of the American Revolution, stark differences between traditions, religious 
toleration, and religious liberty, began to emerge throughout the various colonies.9   
One of the first battles to be fought was the ideological difference between 
religious tolerance and religious liberty in Virginia.10  During the drafting of the 1776, 
Virginia Declaration of Rights, a young James Madison persuaded George Mason to 
amend the wording of the document.  Madison argued that the wording should be 
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changed from, “all men should enjoy the fullest toleration in the exercise of religion,”11  
to the more liberty and rights minded wording of, “all men are equally entitled to the free 
exercise of religion.”12  This single word “free” or freedom moved religion from the 
category of “legislative grace,”13 to an inalienable right through which everyone has “an 
absolute right to believe and worship a Supreme Being in his own way regardless of how 
the other man believes; or he may not believe at all.”14  This action by Madison set a 
precedent for his work towards religious liberty which, in time included the 1785 penning 
of Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments.15 
 While Virginia worked through its own legislative understanding of religious 
freedom, revolutionaries in New England worked with equal fervent, but reached 
different results.  In Massachusetts the notion of freedom of religion came to mean “no 
more than toleration and the absence of government coercion.”16   Massachusetts defined 
religious freedom in negative terms meaning that the “government could promote 
religious belief as long as it did not force anyone to accept it.”17  This distinct difference 
from the Virginian understanding of religious freedom became evident when taking into 
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account Massachusetts’ state sponsorship of the Congregational Church well into the 
1800s.18 
The legal infrastructures concerning religious freedom were done through the 
collaborative efforts of a variety of men, many of whom are referred to as the Founding 
Fathers.  However, over time scholars have placed a greater emphasis on certain 
founders’ thoughts, words, and deeds, while ignoring a large company of forgotten men 
and women who made “salient, consequential contributions to the construction of the 
American republic and its institutions.”19  While it is both impossible and impractical to 
try and ascertain the religious perspective of every Founding Father, it is necessary to try 
and understand the religious opinions of some of the more influential but lesser known 
founders.  As a result of their geographical diversity and their personal convictions, it is 
possible to gain a greater understanding of the religious complexities during the 
revolutionary era.   
In many ways George Washington personified the religious climate of the late 
1700s.  Washington attended the Anglican Church; however, he refused to take 
communion.20  He often referred to God in his correspondence, using the term “divine 
providence,” as well as lesser known terms like “The Grand Architect,” “Superintending 
Power,” “Governor of the Universe,” and “Great Ruler of Events.”21  Washington 
employed such terms when he referred to the passage that the United States had travelled 
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through the Revolution, or when addressing the country as president.22  Washington also 
supported religion as a means of fostering both patriotism and morality, warning in his 
farewell address, “that one who labors to subvert a public role for religion and morality 
cannot call himself a patriot.”23 
While some historians have claimed to have found no trace of Biblical references 
in Washington’s writings, “even a cursory review of Washington’s papers reveals scores 
of quotations from and unmistakable allusions to the Bible.”24  Despite the many uses of 
and references to God and the name of God, no clear evidence exists to suggest that 
Washington was an orthodox Christian.  Despite calling for a national day of prayer 
while in office, Washington is never once recorded referring to Jesus as God.  Rather, 
Washington condoned the blending together of church and state as long as it came from 
personal conviction and served the greater good.  
Washington’s first Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, had a long and 
remarkable record as a Founding Father.  He had a distinguished Revolutionary War 
military career in his own right before serving as Chief of Staff for General Washington.  
After the war Hamilton served as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, signed the 
Constitution, became one of three authors of the Federalist Papers, and served as the 
nation’s first Secretary of the Treasury.   
 Throughout his life Hamilton never affiliated himself with any particular church 
or religious denomination.  His religious beliefs do not fit into either of the two accepted 
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categories for the period: Deism and Christianity.25  Instead, evidence supports the 
likelihood that Hamilton was most likely a “theistic rationalist,”26  who opposed 
“particularist religion and supported toleration – even equality – of religions.”27  Hamilton 
viewed religion as a whole as one of the “venerable pillars that support the edifice of 
civilized society.”28  
Like many of his peers, Hamilton saw the merits of organized religion often tying 
religion to causes which he supported.  Hamilton attempted to use religion as a tool to 
prevent Jefferson from being elected president in 1800.  In his 1796, Phocion essays, 
Hamilton linked Jefferson with the atheism of the French Revolution.29  Additionally, he 
tied religion to America’s patriotic cause, exclaiming that, “in vain does that man claim 
the praise of patriotism who labours to subvert or undermine these great pillars of human 
happiness [religion and morality].”30   Despite his personal indifference to organized 
religion, Hamilton still recommended “a day of fasting, humiliation and prayer” by the 
national government.  Hamilton believed that such actions were “politically useful,” 
“very expedient,” and “proper,” further suggesting that the government would be “very 
unwise, if it does not make the most of the religious prepossessions of our people.”31   
 Patrick Henry also had a distinguished career as a patriot and a politician 
throughout the late 1700s.  Unfortunately, he was one of the many Founding Fathers who 
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did not “save his mail,” thereby limiting the evidence concerning his views on both 
church and state.  From the various forms of correspondence he did leave it is known that 
Patrick Henry was “a traditional Anglican and apparently became even more devout in 
his later years.”32  His final will and testament concluded, “This is all the inheritance I can 
give to my dear family. The religion of Christ can give them one which will make them 
rich indeed.”33  
Despite his own personal beliefs, Henry saw religion as an institution that could 
be used for the greater good of society.  In the 1790s, Henry wrote a letter to Archibald 
Blair in which he shared his belief that only “virtue, morality, and religion” would protect 
America.34  Henry saw immense value in organized religion, believing the church to be an 
“essential prop for civic virtue in the new republic.”35  Possibly the most insightful view 
of Henry concerning religion and government was his stance against the ratification of 
the Constitution.  Henry would not support the proposed 1787 Constitution because it did 
not state that the new federal government could not interfere with religious thought and 
activities.36  While it is probable that Henry believed religion could be used or supported 
by the government to promote national virtue and morality, it is clear that Henry did not 
believe that the government should have any influence over religious beliefs or its 
practices.  
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 George Mason also left a scant paper trail concerning issues surrounding church 
and state.  Mason supported freedom of religious conscience.37  He served as the 
principal draftsman of the 1775 Virginia Declaration of Rights,38  and “was a pivotal 
figure in the struggle to craft a distinctively American doctrine of religious liberty and 
church-state relations for both the commonwealth and the nation.”39  As a result of these 
experiences George Mason, in good conscience, could not support the ratification of the 
Constitution because it did not guarantee that religion would be free from state control or 
influence.40  
Few Founding Fathers possessed a more overt and genuine faith than Samuel 
Adams. Unfortunately, like many other Founding Fathers, his opposition to the 
ratification of the Constitution, and consequent labelling as an Anti-Federalist, left him 
on the wrong side of history.  As a consequence, historians have overlooked Adams’ 
political views in addition to his religious convictions.  Despite this historical oversight, 
Adams was still one of the most energetic patriots before, during, and after the 
Revolution.  
Adams saw the hand of God within the actions of the Revolution and he sought to 
display the same guidance in his personal and political life after the war ended.  Unlike 
many Founders, “Adams’ Christian convictions are especially evident in his views of 
church-state relations.”41  For Adams these views meant not only living by his Christian 
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convictions, but displaying these convictions while in office.  Consequently, Adams 
sought to use his elected office to promote his personal religious convictions, often 
signing many of his essays “a religious politician.”42  As an individual of faith, Adams’ 
declared his reliance “on the merits of Jesus Christ for the pardon of all my sins,”43  and 
who’s goal, by his own admission, was “to promote the spiritual kingdom of Jesus 
Christ.”44  Like many other Christians immersed in the struggle of Revolution, Adams 
expected that God would “erect a mighty empire in America” characterized by “biblical 
morality, manners and zealous efforts to spread liberty and Christianity to the world.”45 
Throughout the Revolution, Adams marshalled religious arguments to “justify 
American independence and trumpeting God’s providential assistance of the patriot’s 
cause.”46  Adams called for national days of fasting and prayer to “seek the Lord,” and in 
doing so, helped give the American Revolution the character of a moral and religious 
crusade.47  Once the war was over, he sought opportunity to serve God and His divine 
aims as a political leader all the while becoming even more “conservative, devout, and 
dedicated to Puritan principles as he aged.”48  While holding office as governor of 
Massachusetts “he repeatedly urged individuals to repent of their disobedience to God’s 
laws,” and accept His “gracious and free pardon” through Jesus Christ, while actively 
working to spread Christianity and build God’s kingdom throughout the world.49  Adams 
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was not alone in his religious zeal, many other colonists supported an established church 
while defending “the free exercise of the rights of conscience.”50  At the Massachusetts 
Constitutional Convention in 1780, Adams proclaimed that every citizen had a “duty” to 
worship “the Supreme Being,” and advocated for the “preserving of the Congregational 
Church as the state’s established religion.”51  
Somewhat ironically, however, Adams opposed the organized church becoming 
involved in secular affairs.52  Adams decried the joining of religious and civil power, 
protesting that such unions had “been fatal to the Liberties of mankind.”53  Additionally, 
Adams applied his religious liberties selectively.  In The Rights of the Colonists as 
Christians (1772), Adams insisted that “all Christians except Papists” should be 
permitted to have their own worship services.54  Like many other colonists at the time, 
Adams believed that Catholics, because of their allegiance to the Pope and their belief in 
“Doctrines subversive of the Civil Government,” should not be granted religious 
freedom.55  Samuel Adams served as both an advocate for Christianity and faithful 
politician to the American cause.  For Adams, no sharp line existed between church and 
state.  The absolute determination that he had was that the state should have no grounds 
or opportunity to interfere with the work of the church.   
 Unlike the Christian beliefs attributed to by his cousin Samuel, John Adams was 
not an orthodox believer of the tenants of the Christian faith.  Instead, John Adams shared 
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similar doubts about traditional Christianity and Christian doctrine to those of Thomas 
Jefferson.56  Religion fascinated Adams; he described God as “the Power that moves, the 
Wisdom that directs, and the Benevolence that sanctifies this grand and mysterious 
universe.”57  However, religion for Adams served more as a form of a moral compass 
than that of a saving grace, guiding light, or eternal promise.  For Adams, Christianity 
was good as an ally to morality.58  Writing during the Revolutionary War Adams 
described religion as an institution which could establish morality and “the principles 
upon which freedom can securely stand.”59 
Benjamin Franklin has become one of the most well-known and celebrated 
founders.  By the time of the Revolutionary War and the subsequent drafting of the 1787 
Constitution, Franklin had endeared himself to international dignitaries, his peers, and his 
fellow Americans.  Franklin subscribed to Deism, a religious perspective more conducive 
to his intellectual abilities spawned during the Enlightenment.60  Although Franklin did 
not maintain an orthodox perspective on religion, he “seemed to endorse stronger views 
of Providence and the efficacy of prayer than one might expect of a deist.”61  An example 
of this was when he proposed that the Constitutional Convention open with prayer before 
beginning its daily business.62  Although Franklin held a skeptical view of religion, he 
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had no objection with combining at least the perfunctory functions of state with the 
fundamental practices of religion.    
Over time the political contributions of John Jay have become less conspicuous.  
Like many less prominent Founding Fathers, Jay possessed an active and successful 
political life and he held strong religious convictions.  Jay never expressed his political or 
religious thoughts in essays and decrees; instead, most of what is known about Jay’s 
views on church and state has been gleaned through “his polemical writings” where he 
argued for the benefit of a specific policy or political decision.63 
At first glance, Jay’s views on religion and politics often appear confusing or 
conflicted.  However, upon further investigation his actions fall in line with his own 
convictions and are consistent with the thoughts of most Americans of his era.  Jay was a 
committed Protestant with his words and deeds suggesting a strong preference for 
orthodox Christianity.64  Like many Americans, he viewed both virtue and religion as 
cornerstones of a good life,65 while working to limit the effect and impact of the Roman 
Catholic Church from the political process.66  
 The perceived inconsistency of Jay’s personal opinion on faith and politics can be 
understood in some of his more public decisions.  As a member of the First Continental 
Congress, Jay was unsure of the legitimacy of letting clergy open sessions with prayer,67 
while as governor of New York, Jay took the unprecedented step of issuing an official 
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Thanksgiving Day proclamation.68  That proclamation obligated “the entire community to 
give thanks and join in prayers.”69  At face value, the questioning of prayer to open 
political sessions while issuing a thanksgiving proclamation is contradictory.  For Jay, the 
issue of prayer at the Continental Congress was not a question of separating church and 
state, it was an effort of conscience to not offend another denomination of the Christian 
faith.70  In fact as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court and as governor of 
New York, Jay worked to integrate church and state by earning Christianity a “more 
robust place” in the public sphere.71 
 Like many Founders, Jay became concerned with the moral direction of the new 
republic.  While the promulgation of Protestant Christianity was always foremost in Jay’s 
mind, he also turned to Christianity as a means of moral guidance for the nation.  Jay 
believed that moral virtue could be asserted through Christianity as the most effective 
means to ensure successful and peaceful governance.  According to Jay, it was 
impossible to “maintain both order and freedom, both cohesiveness and liberty apart from 
the moral precepts of the Christian Religion.  Should our Republic ever forget this 
fundamental precept of governance, we will then, be surely doomed.”72  Unfortunately, 
further examination of Jay’s thoughts on church and state has been limited because many 
of Jay’s letters and papers were destroyed at his own request after his death.  What can be 
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discerned is that Jay’s views on religion and politics were not exclusive; instead, one was 
used to help support the other in the promotion of both the Gospel and good citizenry.   
A religious man of devout Christian faith since his childhood, Benjamin Rush 
committed himself to the establishment of a Christian republic.73  For Rush, such an 
understanding moved far beyond evangelism as he sought to use Christianity to help 
cultivate the “principles, morals, and manners” of American citizens.74  According to 
Rush, a Christian nation needed to confront and resolve many of the contentious political 
issues including abolition, temperance, the elimination of the death penalty, humane 
treatment of criminals and the insane, as well as educational reforms, including female 
education.  Rush believed that the only method to deal with these issues was with 
religious thought and judgment, appealing to the convictions of both the average 
American and civic leaders.75  
As a consequence of such beliefs, Rush became one of the most avid supporters 
of the union between church and state.  He believed that by placing Christianity at the 
foundation of a republican education, state officials could defuse both the problem of 
trying to infuse revolutionary zeal into republican virtue as well as promoting the present 
religious fervor associated with religion and Christianity into republicanism.76  Rush 
believed that “a Christian cannot fail of being a republican,”77 reinforcing his own belief 
that the main purpose of education was to train “men, citizens, and Christians” rather than 
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“scholars.”78  For Rush, education constituted a means to an end.  Religion was not the 
subject itself that needed to be promoted.  Instead religion provided the vehicle through 
which republicanism could be promoted and the many social ills of the period could be 
addressed.  Rush never saw the union of church and state through education as a conflict 
of interest; rather, he saw one as a compliment to the other with the end result being the 
promotion of republican virtue and morality.  
Thomas Paine was a steadfast Deist to the day he died.  Paine’s deism could not 
“account for the reality of moral evil,” and so he advocated for religious liberty and 
freedom as a means to providing the “moral bedrock” for a free society.79  Though raised 
in both the Church of England and as a Quaker, Paine never embraced the faith of his 
parents, choosing instead to first dismiss religion, before distaining institutionalized 
religion altogether.80  A gifted writer, Paine’s first great literary success was the 1776, 
revolutionary pamphlet known as Common Sense.  Though unimpressed with religion, 
Paine was both wise and shrewd enough to understand that, “arguments couched in 
biblical authority carried greater weight with believers than those based on mere mortal 
authority,” and so he laced Common Sense with Biblical references and arguments.81  
Historians describe Edmund Randolph as a “central actor in Virginia’s 
revolutionary and constitutional politics from the 1770s to the 1790s,” attending the 
Constitutional Convention and upon his retirement in 1795, he wrote History of 
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Virginia.82  Like many of his contemporaries, Randolph’s spiritual journey evolved over 
time.  Randolph’s family had an established tradition of religious heterodoxy.  Beginning 
in his childhood with Unitarianism before moving onto the Church of England, then 
concluding his spiritual journey at the new Protestant Episcopal Church.83  Unfortunately 
Randolph left behind few personal papers, and his official correspondence is “not 
especially revealing of the influence of religion on his political thought.”84  In History of 
Virginia, however, it is possible to extrapolate some of Randolph’s thoughts concerning 
the relationship between religion and state.  
 Randolph supported disestablishment but not as a result of the same convictions 
as deists like Jefferson.85  Randolph believed that Jefferson’s ardent support of religious 
toleration was because of his strong belief in deism.86  For Randolph, religious 
establishment was undesirable because it produced indolent clergy whom he described as 
men who “delighted rather in the lethargy of fixed salaries than in the trouble of thought, 
learning, and research.”87  For Randolph, he favored disestablishment because he felt it 
would better promote commitment to religious devotion in Virginia.88  In 1786, the 
Virginia House of Burgesses passed Jefferson’s “Bill to Establish Religious Freedom,” 
with the support of Madison and a coalition of minority religious groups, including the 
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Baptists and the Presbyterians.89  Randolph made clear, however, that the bill was not 
passed to force a clear separation between church and state, but rather to combat the clear 
favoritism shown to the Church of England by the state government.90  For Randolph, the 
role of religion constituted an important path to the successful development of a growing 
nation.  
Thomas Jefferson’s views on religion are the most prominent of all the Founding 
Fathers.  Great fanfare has been made of his strong views as a Deist, and even more 
people are familiar with his even stronger convictions concerning the separation of 
church and state.  Characterizing Jefferson’s religious views within these two parameters, 
however, limits both the full contribution Jefferson brings to the church and state debate, 
and excludes other arguments that help to contextualize the religious climate of his day.  
 Jefferson never felt that the federal government had any authority concerning 
religious affairs.  Writing in his 1785, Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson argued 
that the rights of conscience of an individual could not be surrendered to civil authority,91 
a position he further emphasized in his 1803, letter to the Danbury Baptists by declaring 
that, “the legislative powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions.”92  
Furthermore, Jefferson stated that “Certainly, no power to prescribe any religious 
exercise, or to assume authority in religious discipline, has been delegated to the General 
Government.  It must then rest with the States, as far as it can be in any human 
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authority.”93  Needless to say, while this power rested with the states, Jefferson believed 
it was not the domain of the states to dictate how this power was used or abused, noting 
that “state support of religion inevitably corrupts religion.”94   
Jefferson believed that “to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the 
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical; that 
even the forcing of him to support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is 
depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular 
pastor whose morals he would make his pattern, and whose powers he feels most 
persuasive to righteousness.”95  Instead, religious freedom should be safeguarded by the 
state in order that every person should be able to worship with a free conscience since 
every person was answerable for themselves before God.96  
These arguments are not based on any political or theological conviction outside 
of Jefferson’s own opinion and his “little sympathy for religious institutions and their 
priests.”97  Like many Deists, Jefferson found the orthodox beliefs of Christianity to be 
untenable and incongruent to his moralistic and reasoned approach to religion.  Instead, 
Jefferson understood Christianity as a set of “conniving priests” who misconstrued and 
misinterpreted the teaching of Jesus as to leave his true doctrines as a series of 
“mysticisms, fancies, and falsehoods.”98  Additionally, Jefferson understood organized 
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religion to be far more concerned with profit and “power-hungry manipulators” than the 
morality of humanity.99 
 The most underappreciated aspect of Jefferson’s religious opinions was his 
propensity to favor his own personal convictions above those of everyone else.  A person 
can “fairly observe” that Jefferson’s views concerning religious liberty were “remarkably 
hospitable to his own brand or religious experience and far less protective of the religious 
experiences of others.”100  The most famous example of this occurred at Monticello after 
his retirement.  There Jefferson spent hours compiling the “Life and Morals of Jesus.”  
From a careful examination of the New Testament in Greek, Latin, French, and English, 
Jefferson extracted verses that emphasized the ethical content of Jesus’ teaching, 
cropping out all signs of the supernatural and miracles.  He hoped to make Christianity 
“appear less the abstruse metaphysical system and more the clear moral code by which 
people could live.”101  Such beliefs and actions made Jefferson, while certainly a 
“brilliant mind and influential in establishing and administering the early republic,” not 
even close to being representative of “either the mindset or the lifestyle of the average 
American.”102  Consequently, Jefferson’s “dominance of First Amendment theory is 
historically untenable.  There are persuasive grounds for believing that, if anything, the 
First Amendment owes more to evangelical passion than to Enlightenment 
skepticism.”103 
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 While not as explicitly stated as other founders, Madison’s personal views on 
religion can be pieced together through his personal correspondence.  It is probable that 
Madison was not a Deist, despite his close friendship with Jefferson.  Instead, Madison 
prescribed in some degree to the Christian faith.  To William Bradford, Madison exhorted 
that a “watchful eye must be kept on ourselves lest . . . we neglect to have our names 
enrolled in the Annals of Heaven.”104  Madison also went to church, however, it is 
speculative to suggest his level of orthodoxy.105  
 The degree to which Madison believed religion should be immersed into politics 
is the most important issue.  The first and most important observation that needs to be 
made concerning Madison’s view on religion is that he envisioned freedom “for religion 
rather than a Jeffersonian freedom from religion.”106  This idea is critical to understanding 
the meaning behind the First Amendment as it pertains to religion.  Unlike Jefferson, 
Madison recognized that freedom of religion had to embrace more than mere opinion.107  
In his 1785, Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison expressed that it was the right of 
every man, to “exercise” his religion according to the dictate of his conscience, 
advocating for freedom “to embrace, to profess and to observe” whatever religion an 
individual believed to be of divine origin.108  
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 In addition to freedom for religion, Madison advocated freedom of religion.  
Madison believed that both the state and federal legislatures could not legislate, govern, 
or interfere with religious opinion or practices because it was the dictates of a man’s 
conscience and convictions.109  For Madison, “power over religion was not given to the 
government but rather reserved to the people themselves,” consequently, Madison 
opposed the drafting of a Bill of Rights.110  Madison believed it was unnecessary to 
prohibit the exercising of a power not granted to the federal government.  In Madison’s 
estimation the new government possessed not even “the shadow of right” to meddle in 
religion.111  As Madison argued, “the same authority which can force a citizen to 
contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any establishment, may 
force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever.”112  Therefore, 
just as the state should be unable to compel anyone to contribute money in support of 
religion, the government should equally have no power to regulate religion.  The only 
caveat to this principle, Madison believed, was if the particular practices of a religion 
threatened the existence of the state itself.113 
 The wall of separation between church and state that Jefferson was so eager to 
establish did not materialize the same way, either in principle or in practice, for Madison.  
On a personal level Madison encouraged public officials to share their Christian beliefs, 
stating that men, “who occupy the most honorable and gainful departments and [who] are 
rising in reputation and wealth, publicly to declare their unsatisfactoriness by becoming 
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fervent advocates in the cause of Christ.”114  This practice and encouragement of personal 
faith was not limited to public officials.  Madison believed that it was the “mutual duty of 
all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity toward each other,”115 in addition 
to endorsing public and official religious expressions by issuing several proclamations for 
national days of prayer, fasting, and thanksgiving.116 
 The history surrounding the wording of the First Amendment also challenges the 
separation theory.  Madison’s original proposal for the wording of the First Amendment 
was, “The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, 
nor shall any national religion be established.”117  Such wording supported Madison’s 
opposition to the establishment of a national religion or denomination, not the prohibition 
of public religious activities.  He reemphasized this position throughout the debates 
surrounding the Bill of Rights and with his actions.118  If Madison was in favor of a strict 
separation of church and state it is worth investigating why, in 1789, he served on the 
Congressional committee which authorized, approved, and selected paid Congressional 
chaplains,119 and supported the distribution of Bibles using federal funds.  
 Madison’s primary objective concerning issues of religion focused more on 
keeping the government out of religion as opposed to the more modern understanding 
that focuses on keeping religion out of government.  Madison conceded, however, that 
trying to delineate the line of separation between religion and government was fraught 
                                                 
114 Madison, The Letters, 66. 
115 George Mason, The Virginia Declaration of Rights, Section 16.  
116 James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 
1789-1897 (Published by Authority of Congress, 1899), 513. 
117 1 Annals of Congress 451, (June 8, 1789). 
118 1 Annals of Congress 729–759, (August 15, 1789). 
119 1 Annals of Congress 109, (April 9, 1789). 
61 
 
with difficulty.  Commenting on the problem, Madison stated that he, “must admit 
moreover that it may not be easy, in every possible case, to trace the line of separation 
between the rights of religion and the Civil authority with such distinctness as to avoid 
collisions & doubts on unessential points.”120  Madison further stated that the “tendency 
to a usurpation on one side or the other, or to a corrupting coalition or alliance between 
them, will be best guarded against by an entire abstinence of the government from 
interference in any way whatever, beyond the necessity of preserving public order, & 
protecting each sect against trespasses on its legal rights by others.”121  The significance 
of this last statement cannot be underestimated.  Through it, Madison advocated not that 
religion should be removed from every sphere of political thought and action, but that the 
government itself should be prohibited from legislating or adjudicating on any religious 
issues outside of those that threaten public safety and nation security.  Unlike Jefferson, 
Madison was a staunch advocate of freedom for religion rather than freedom from 
religion which Jefferson advocated.  
While Madison and Jefferson hold the most preeminent positions concerning the 
modern interpretation of church and state, another Founding Father should be considered 
more authoritative than either of them.  Unlike any other Founding Father, Roger 
Sherman holds a unique place in the annals of American history.  Despite the fame 
surrounding Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and others, Sherman is the only Founding 
Father to sign the Declaration and Resolves (1774), the Articles of Association (1774), 
the Declaration of Independence (1776), the Articles of Confederation (1777, 1778), and 
                                                 




the Constitution (1787).  Additionally, like Jefferson, he authored a significant state law 
concerning religious liberty; however, unlike Jefferson, he also participated in the debates 
over the exact wording and meaning of the First Amendment,122 served as a judge on 
Connecticut’s Superior Court, and was a member of the United States House of 
Representatives and the United States Senate.  During his time in Congress, Sherman 
debated the Bill of Rights as it was being drafted,123 and served on the committee with 
Madison which reconciled the House and Senate versions of the Bill of Rights.124  
 Roger Sherman was an “orthodox Christian” who adhered to the reformed 
theological tradition.  Sherman, too, was both a proponent of religious liberty and thought 
it appropriate for states and the national government to promote Christianity.125  Sherman 
was one of the few founders who made “life-long efforts to base their personal lives on 
biblical teachings.”126  Consequently, Sherman’s faith influenced his political ideas and 
actions in a variety of ways.127  While serving in the Continental Congress, Sherman 
helped to draft a recommendation that states set aside April 26, 1780, as a day of “fasting, 
humiliation, and prayer,”128 and was also a strong supporter for a national day of 
Thanksgiving.129 
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Sherman also believed that the promotion of Christianity was necessary for 
political prosperity.130  He believed that the states had the primary responsibility for 
promoting religion and morality, and protecting religious liberty.  As a result of being a 
member of the Constitution Convention, Sherman understood the limited powers of the 
federal government.  These limited powers included an understanding that Congress 
could neither create an established church nor restrict religious liberty because it was not 
granted the power to do so.  However, Sherman believed that the national government 
could encourage religious practices as the Continental Congress had done throughout the 
Revolutionary War.131 
Through not only his faith but his actions, Roger Sherman is more representative 
and more authoritative than Jefferson concerning issues surrounding religion and 
politics.132  Unfortunately, comparatively far fewer of Sherman’s papers have survived 
than Jefferson’s.133  Consequently, historians and legal scholars have tended to dismiss 
Sherman’s contributions to America’s founding and its founding documents.  When 
United States Supreme Court justices have used history to interpret the First 
Amendment’s religion clauses, they have made 112 distinct references to Jefferson but 
mentioned Sherman on only three occasions.134  It is both sad and ironic that a man that 
had so much influence in drafting and debating the religion clauses would receive so little 
historical consultation when excavating their meaning, and even less consideration when 
discerning their application.  
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 When the historical context of the First Amendment is examined within the light 
of even just a small sampling of the Founding Fathers’ religious convictions, opinions, 
and objections, it becomes clear that the Supreme Court’s idealistic interpretation of the 
Founders’ intentions is not correct.  The first session of the Continental Congress opened 
its daily sessions with prayer.  The second session appointed and funded legislative 
chaplains to offer these prayers as well as chaplains to serve with the military forces.135  
Additionally, on June 12, 1775, the Continental Congress called for the first of four fast 
days of “publick humiliation, fasting, and prayer; that we may, with united hearts and 
voices, unfeignedly confess and deplore our many sins,” and that we may “be ever under 
the care and protection of a kind of Providence, and be prospered.”136  
Building upon these earlier actions, on September 11, 1777, the Continental 
Congress voted to import 20,000 Bibles for distribution in the new states,137 an action that 
did not occur because of the lack of funds.  That same year on November 1, Congress 
issued the first of what became the annual Thanksgiving Day celebration, by proclaiming 
that “it is the indispensable Duty of all men to adore the superintending Providence of 
Almighty God; to acknowledge with Gratitude their Obligation to him for Benefits 
received, and to implore such farther Blessings as they stand in need of.”138  Later, during 
the drafting of the 1787, Northwest Ordinance, one of the Ordinances’ fundamental 
principles stated that, “No person, demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly manner, 
shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship, or religious sentiments.”139  
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Through these actions it is clear that the Founding Fathers did not believe in separating 
the actions of the federal government from religion.  Instead, it is most likely that the 
founders wanted to prohibit the authority of the government over religion.   
During ratification of the Constitution the Federalists had to assure the general 
public that the proposed Congress had no power over religion because it was not 
“specifically enumerated in the Constitution.”140  The states themselves were to be left to 
their own devices on matters of religious liberty, with many adopting their own, variously 
worded, guarantees of religion into their own constitutions.  These guarantees were 
neither controlled nor enforced by federal authority, with a few states like Massachusetts, 
continuing to have established churches, enforcing tithes for specific churches, “tithes for 
religion in general, and laws against certain religions well into the nineteenth century.”141  
Unfortunately, at that time many Americans, including some Founding Fathers, 
failed to see an omission of religious regulation as a guarantee of religious freedom.  
Jefferson, who was in France at the time of the drafting and ratification of the 
Constitution commented in a 1788, letter to a friend that he “expressed disappointment at 
the absence of an express declaration insuring the freedom of religion, but was willing to 
accept it as it was, trusting that the good sense and honest intentions of the people would 
bring about the necessary alterations.”142  The necessary altercations, as Jefferson put it, 
came with the drafting and passage of the Bill of Rights.  
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Madison designed the federal Bill of Rights to safeguard what many Americans 
understood to be inalienable rights as a part of the promises given to various states during 
the ratification process.  Unfortunately an accurate understanding of the framers intent 
cannot be determined by studying the debates over the First Amendment clauses from the 
First Session of Congress in 1789.143  The minutes concerning these debates, their content 
and the reasoning behind the amendments in the Bill of Rights are, “exceedingly cryptic 
and conclusory;”144 a fact which has not stopped the courts and commentators from using 
them despite their ample room for speculation and interpolation.145 
Notwithstanding the cryptic and conclusory nature of the debate minutes what is 
clear is that the original senators debated over what the words “establish religion” 
meant.146  James Madison thought that if the word “national” was inserted before 
religion, “it would satisfy the minds of honorable gentleman.”147  Madison believed that 
people feared “one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine together, and 
establish a religion to which they would compel others to conform.”148  Consequently, 
Madison thought that if the word national was introduced, it would point the amendment 
“directly to the object he believed it was intended to prevent.”149  Additional historical 
evidence suggests that most Americans in 1789, supported Madison’s perspective, which 
defined establishment of religion as a government preference for one religion over 
another.  Along with Madison, John Leland, a Baptist minister and one of the leaders of 
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the movement for the Bill of Rights, also thought of establishment in terms of 
preference.150  It is both unsurprising and unhelpful that there was no clear understanding 
about what “establish religion” meant, since the drafters of the First Amendment could 
not agree themselves.  Despite this lack of consensus Congress wrote religious liberty 
into the Constitution as one of the fundamentals of a free people.151 
Despite the wide variance in religious convictions found among the Founding 
Fathers and conflicting opinions about the exact meaning of the First Amendment’s 
Establishment Clause, one application for religion and religious principles shines 
through.  All of the Founding Fathers agreed that religion was fundamental for good 
morality, which was essential to establishing a successful republic.  They were united in 
their belief that a “self-governing people must be a well-informed and virtuous people; 
thus, they encouraged education and religion, which they believed nurtured these 
qualities.”152 
Whether the Founding Fathers were orthodox Christian believers or subscribed to 
some kind of deistic belief in God, they promoted religion as a form of national virtue.  
Both John Adams and Thomas Jefferson thought morality essential to the “well-being of 
the country and Christianity – a purified, reasonable Christianity – was the best 
instrument for instructing and enforcing the moral duties.”153  Jefferson’s “edited” Bible 
sought to “rid it of all corruptions,”154 including the “supernaturalism that mocked the 
laws of nature,” in the Old Testament, and all accounts of miracles and supernatural tales, 
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in the New Testament, leaving only the moral teachings attributed to Jesus as a way to 
foster civic virtue.155  Jefferson reduced religious experience to little more than “a matter 
of morality,”156 believing that only when religious principles break out into “overt acts 
against peace and good order” should the government intervene to prevent such acts.157  
For Jefferson, true Christianity was “the most benevolent and sublime system of morality 
that ever shone upon the world.”158 
Likewise, George Washington when addressing the General Assembly of 
Presbyterian Churches, stated his belief that “the pious practice of sound religion was 
essential to good citizenship.”159  During his Farewell Address Washington admonished 
that, “of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and 
morality are indispensable supports.  In vain would that man claim the tribute of 
patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these 
firmest props of the duties of men and citizens,”160 adding “let us with caution indulge the 
supposition that morality can be maintained without religion.”161 
 Benjamin Franklin used and promoted Jesus Christ as his moral model and guide.  
While dismissing his claim to divinity, Franklin embraced Jesus’ morality, exclaiming “I 
think the System of Morals and his Religion, as he [Jesus] left them to us, the best the 
World ever saw or is likely to see.”162  Concluding when Jesus drafted his religious creed, 
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“he made morality, not theology, the centerpiece of a good life.”163  Meanwhile 
Hamilton, in a more orthodox context promoted similar ideals, expressing that “morality 
cannot be separated from religion,” and that those who love liberty know that “morality 
must fall with religion.”164 
 Because of his strong religious convictions, Roger Sherman was also a strong 
proponent of Christianity as a means of promoting morality.  According to Sherman, 
“one of the most critical components with respect to the common good is the freedom to 
worship God in a society that promotes Christian morality.”165  This Christian morality 
Sherman believed was useful for “the happiness of a People, and the good Order of Civil 
Society [and] Piety,”166 the likes of which were the duty and responsibility of the Civil 
Authority to “provide for the Support and encouragement thereof.”167  Whether it was in 
conjunction with personal convictions and evangelism, or merely for the prosperity and 
wellbeing of the fledgling nation, the Founding Fathers supported and encouraged the 
promotion of religion as a means of morality and civic virtue.  The only caveat to this 
religious endorsement was that any religious activity must not be “contrary to proper and 
accepted morals,”168 which would make the exercise self-defeating.  
The religious backgrounds of the Founding Fathers are as varied and diverse as 
their views are on politics, the Establishment Clause, and the principle known as the 
separation of church and state.  Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Paine, George Washington, 
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and John Adams, were all heterodox in their religious beliefs and who, with the exception 
of Washington and Adams, were ardent critics of the ecclesiastical establishments of their 
day.169  Historians cite Madison and Jefferson as ecclesiastical co-laborers, representing 
the spiritual voice of the founding generation, but they were not always of one mind on 
the meaning of “establishment” or their understanding of religious freedom.170  Even 
more ironic is that both Jefferson’s and Madison’s views on religion and church-state 
relations are “among the least representative of the founders.”171 
Unfortunately, historians such as Edwin S. Gaustad’s Faith of Our Fathers: 
Religion and the New Nation (1987), Steven Waldman’s Founding Faith: Providence, 
Politics, and the Birth of Religious Freedom in America (2008), David L. Holmes’s The 
Faiths of the Founding Fathers (2006), and, Brooke Allen’s Moral Minority: Our 
Skeptical Founding Fathers (2007),172 among others, all focus on the “elite fraternity” of 
famous founders, providing a distorted perspective on religion and the role it played 
during the Revolutionary era.  This distortion, however, is of more than just an academic 
interest because these founders’ views have carried “significant weight in contemporary 
political and legal discourse.”173  
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The religion clauses of state constitutions and of the First Amendment, crafted 
between 1776 and 1789, express both theological and political sentiments.  They were a 
reflection of both the religious convictions of believers as well as the calculations of their 
political leaders.174  The clauses manifested both the “certitude of such eighteenth-
century theologians as Isaac Backus and John Witherspoon and the skepticism of such 
contemporaneous philosophers as Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine.”175  To suggest 
that religion played little or no role in politics following the ratification of the First 
Amendment lacks evidence; all evidence suggests the large role religion played during 
this era.  Unfortunately, the inconsistent efforts by historians to provide a platform for all 
the Founding Fathers voices to be heard has helped provide an inconsistent application of 










                                                 









RELIGIOUS FREEDOM BY JUDICIAL TEST 
Over the last seven decades the United States Supreme Court has immersed itself 
more and more into the complex web of litigation concerning religion.  Religious 
litigation corresponds to the religion clauses of the First Amendment: the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.  Beginning with Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296 (1940), and Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Supreme Court 
applied the First Amendment religion clauses to the states, reading its guarantees into the 
general liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment that “No state shall deprive any 
person of … liberty … without due process of law.”1  Since Cantwell, the Court has ruled 
on over 150 cases concerning religion, seeking to create a national rule on religious 
liberty that was “binding on all federal, state, and local officials.”2  Unfortunately, the 
Court has done more to exacerbate all parties concerning religious legislation, 
particularly those rulings surrounding the Establishment Clause, thereby leaving the 
standards of review in such cases as “disorderly and confusing.”3  Through the Everson 
decision, Associate Justice Hugo Black tried to establish a “high, impregnable, and un-
breachable wall,”4 that could easily delineate between issues concerning church and state.  
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According to Provost of Princeton University Christopher L. Eisgruber and law professor 
Lawrence G. Sager, Black’s impregnable wall metaphor failed to provide “a sensible 
conceptual apparatus for the analysis of religious liberty.”5  Instead, Eisgruber and Sager 
argued that practical reality suggested rather than a high and impregnable wall, the wall 
should be “raised in some places and lowered in others.  Or that it should have holes in 
it.”6  Unfortunately, such a possibility is impossible, so Eisgruber and Sager came to the 
conclusion that the Supreme Court’s definition needs to be restated. 
 To add both clarity and consistency to their decisions, the justices of the Supreme 
Court devised a number of tests to help guide the judicial process when rendering 
verdicts on issues of religion.  The oldest test is the Establishment Clause Test, devised 
by Justice Black during his majority opinion on Everson.  According to Black, the 
meaning of the “establishment of religion clause” or test stated that: 
 Neither a state nor the federal government can set up a church. 
 Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions nor prefer one 
religion over another.  
 Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church 
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.  
 No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or 
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.  
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 No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious 
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called or whatever form they may 
adopt to teach or practice religion.  
 Neither a state nor the federal government can openly or secretly participate in the 
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.7 
While not presented in this forensic fashion, these principles became known as the 
Establishment Clause Test.  Over the last 60 years other tests have been introduced by the 
Supreme Court to gauge the constitutionality of laws and actions, including some that 
have replaced the Establishment Clause Test.  
 The most widely used test was the Lemon Test, derived from the Supreme Court 
case Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  This test became the standard of judicial 
review in cases involving the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  The Lemon 
Test involved three criteria for judging whether laws or governmental actions were 
allowable under the Establishment Clause.  Those three criteria were: Does the 
challenged law, or other governmental action, have a bona fide secular (non-religious) or 
civic purpose?  Secondly, does the primary effect of the law or action neither advance nor 
inhibit religion?  In other words, is it neutral?  And finally, does the law or action avoid 
excessive entanglement of government with religion?8  If the answer to all three is yes, 
the law passes the Lemon Test; however, if a negative answer resulted from any of the 
three questions then the law or action was unconstitutional. 
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In addition to the Lemon Test is the Marsh Test.  The Marsh Test, from Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), is a ruling in which the Court upheld legislative prayers; 
however, it did not use Lemon as a benchmark.  Instead, the Court traced history back to 
the debates on the Constitution and Bill of Rights, concluding that such prayers were 
permissible since “the same statesman, on the same day they agreed on the language of 
the First Amendment, authorized Congress to pay a chaplain to open each session with 
prayer.”9  In essence, the Court viewed the contemporaneous actions taken by those who 
framed the First Amendment as “weighty evidence” of its intent.10  If the historical bread 
crumbs can be followed to the founder’s intent, then present judicial jurisprudence maybe 
be sidestepped.  
 Another test for religion is the Endorsement Test.  In 1984, Associate Justice 
Sandra Day O’Conner, in a concurring opinion, first proposed the Endorsement Test in 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).  The Endorsement Test seeks to answer the 
question whether the challenged law or government action has “either the purpose or 
effect of endorsing religion or disapproving of religion in the eyes of the community 
members.”11  Justice O’Connor argued, “Endorsement sends a message to non-adherents 
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the 
political community . . ..  What is crucial is that the government practices not have the 
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effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of 
religion.”12  The Endorsement Test asks what a reasonable person would perceive from 
this law or action concerning religion. 
 Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy proposed a Coercion Test following Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).  The background for this test originated from the possible 
psychological coerciveness of clergy-led prayer at high school graduation ceremonies.  
The Court found that, “the school district’s supervision and control of a high school 
graduation ceremony places subtle and indirect public and peer pressure on attending 
students to stand as a group or maintain respectful silence during the invocation and 
benediction.”13  Consequently, the Court ruled in its decision that “at a minimum, the 
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate 
in religion or its exercise.”14 
 Unfortunately, these judicial tests have not clarified or simplified constitutional 
issues concerning religion.  If anything, they have muddied the constitutional waters, 
exposing Court inconsistencies across a variety of religious topics.  Consequently, it has 
been easy for many groups to criticize the Supreme Court, especially if their rulings have 
come down on the opposite side of an individual’s principles and values.  Many decisions 
exist where separationists and accommodationists have adjudged themselves to have been 
slighted or wronged using Court precedents to validate their cases.  In light of these 
circumstances, the examination of the following Supreme Court cases are not meant to 
cast judgment concerning the validity of the decisions and whether they were historically, 
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factually, or theoretically correct.  Nor is the examination of the following cases meant to 
vilify the separationists or accommodationists which argued them.  Instead, the following 
cases illustrate the inconsistencies surrounding Supreme Court decisions pertaining to the 
establishment of religion, and in many instances the free exercise of religion as well.  
Through the inconsistencies found in these cases, it should become clear that both, the 
idea of “separation of church and state,” and, the fundamental principles surrounding the 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction and treatment of matters pertaining to religion needs to be 
reevaluated and reapplied.  
The first two decisions to be addressed are Lynch v. Donnelly, 463 U.S. 783 
(1983), and County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 
(1989).  Both of these decisions address Christmas “decorations” and whether the use of 
a Christmas crèche, and in the case of Allegheny, a Chanukah menorah, are legitimate 
holiday decorations or an endorsement of a certain religion, and therefore in violation of 
the Establishment Clause.  The next two cases are Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 
(1985), and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993).  These two 
cases focus on the examination of public money being used to help enhance the learning 
of disadvantaged learners in parochial schools.  The final two cases are McCreary County 
v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005), and Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 
(2005).  Both of these cases dealt with the circumstances surrounding the displaying of 
the Ten Commandments on state property and within state buildings.   
Lynch v. Donnelly, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)  
In 1982, Daniel Donnelly and the American Civil Liberties Union’s (ACLU), 
Rhode Island affiliate, filed a lawsuit alleging a violation of the First Amendment.  
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Donnelly alleged that Dennis Lynch, individually and as mayor of the City of Pawtucket, 
Rhode Island, had erected a religious crèche as a part of an annual secular holiday 
display.  Donnelly believed that this crèche was a violation of the First Amendment 
because it could be perceived as an endorsement of one religion over another.  Such an 
endorsement would be a violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause which 
states in part, “Congress [and other government authorities] shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion,”15  In 1983, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to 
review the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which had 
affirmed the District Court's ruling that the crèche was indeed in violation of the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.16  The fundamental argument surrounding 
Lynch v. Donnelly was that the lower federal courts “held that a municipality is 
prohibited by the Establishment Clause from including a crèche in a dominantly secular 
Christmas display maintained on private property during the Christmas season.”17  The 
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to test the issue of whether “a passive and 
contextually muted display of a crèche as a part of a dominantly secular municipal 
Christmas celebration violates the Establishment Clause.”18     
 The Supreme Court petitioner Pawtucket Mayor Dennis M. Lynch and associates, 
based their argument for this case on the history of the display, and the degree to which 
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government contact with religion was permissible.19  The city owned the crèche in 
question, having bought it in 1943.  Along with the rest of the holiday display, the crèche 
had been added to regularly over a number of years, was stored on city property year 
round, with the crèche making up a portion of a conventional and traditional display of 
holiday symbolism.20  The petitioner’s argued that a government celebration of Christmas 
was a secular activity.  The “American Christmas” was a national folk festival which was 
derived from the Christian celebration of the nativity and the birth of Christ.  Although 
the nativity theme and the holiday’s origins have not disappeared from the contemporary 
observance, over time the nativity has been overshadowed by the secular components of 
the national festival.21   
The petitioners’ also believed that the Establishment Clause’s principles defined 
“the degree to which government contact with religion is permissible.”22  They argued 
that a removal of all religiosity from government activity is neither practical nor desirable 
because the religious tradition of the American Christmas is too deeply ingrained in the 
life of the nation.  While the government is prohibited from promoting religion, “passive 
acknowledgement of the religious tradition” is not promotion of religion.23  Using 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1960), as precedence, the petitioners’ argued that 
despite the religious origins of the American Christmas, United States culture did not 
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prohibit public observance of contemporary secular events derived from religious 
origins.24   
The petitioners’ argument rested on the principle that when the “secular aspects of 
an activity dominate the religious aspects, a government many engage in such activity 
without offending the Establishment Clause.  The underlying constitutional standard is 
whether the government is conducting a secular or a religious exercise.”25  They believed 
that in light of the Court’s previous decisions concerning such issues of religion, “the 
tripartite [Lemon] test must be applied to the entire governmental activity and not merely 
to a single religious element in that activity.”26  The petitioners believed that the 
fundamental issue in this case was whether the city’s celebration of Christmas was 
predominantly a religious or secular activity. 
 The respondents to this Supreme Court case, rather than arguing against the 
history of the Christmas festival, focused their efforts on proving religious intent and the 
religious nature of the holiday display.  To prove intent, the ACLU seized upon the 
actions of the Mayor Lynch after the filing of the case.  The ACLU alleged that after the 
mayor heard about the filing of the lawsuit, he vowed to fight against the ACLU’s 
attempt to take “Christ out of Christmas,”27  and then lead children in the singing of 
Christmas carols.28  The ACLU also presented expert testimony from a Methodist Church 
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minister stating that the crèche was in fact a sacred religious symbol, rather than a prop 
used in the promotion of holiday cheer.29   
 In addition to arguing against the stated intent of the petitioners, the ACLU 
argued that the city had endorsed and promulgated religious beliefs through the use of the 
crèche.  To prove that the city had endorsed and promulgated religious beliefs the ACLU 
provided support for their case through the aid of the District Court’s ruling which agreed 
that, “Christmas retains strong significance as a religious holiday and that the Nativity 
scene is primarily an embodiment of Christian beliefs concerning the birth and nature of 
Jesus Christ.”30  In conjunction with this support, the respondents presented further 
evidence from the District Court’s ruling that, as a result of this statement, the crèche 
itself had violated all three aspects of the Lemon Test.  Consequently, the mayor and the 
city, through political divisiveness, had failed to establish any “compelling governmental 
interest in the erection of the Nativity scene.”31  The respondents concluded their 
argument by highlighting the realization that “relationships which tend to endanger 
religious-civil peace are forbidden because they are a ‘warning signal’ that the mandate 
of the First Amendment has been compromised.”32 
 Despite the mayor’s overt bias towards Christianity and the clear religious 
overtones of a Christmas crèche, the Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the lower 
courts.  In doing so, the Court cited three main reasons.  First, “whatever benefit there 
was to one faith or religion or to all religions, it was indirect, remote, and incidental.”33  
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Second, the Court held that “the display of the crèche was no more an advancement or 
endorsement of religion than the congressional and executive recognition of the origins of 
Christmas itself as “Christ's Mass,” or the exhibition of hundreds of religious paintings in 
governmentally supported museums.”34  Finally, the Court believed that the city “had a 
secular purpose (the celebration of Christmas) for including the crèche.”35  By a five to 
four split decision, the Court concluded that the city had not violated the Establishment 
Clause or the Lemon Test by impermissibly advancing religion, and the inclusion of the 
crèche had not created an excessive entanglement between religion and government.36 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)  
In 1986, the ACLU of Greater Pittsburgh filed a lawsuit against the County of 
Allegheny alleging that the display of a nativity crèche and a Chanukah menorah on or 
around government buildings violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  
The crèche and menorah in question were part of a Christmas carol program on the steps 
of the County Courthouse, known as the Grand Staircase.  The County erected the crèche 
on the steps of the Grand Staircase where the choirs performed, while the menorah was 
located outside the City-County Building.37  Since the program’s inception in 1968, the 
nativity crèche in conjunction with the choral program, had been part of the holiday 
festivities.   
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The County of Allegheny started the program as a dedication to world peace and 
brotherhood, and to the memory of those missing from the Vietnam War, the purpose of 
which has remained unchanged.38  Over time, the County decorated the entire area 
surrounding the Courthouse where the Christmas carol program was held in traditional 
Christmas fashion.  These displays included wreaths, trees and Santa Clauses, as well as 
the menorah in question.39  The only change during this time period had been the use of a 
new crèche, which program supporters replaced in 1981.  The nativity scene was not 
owned by the County, and other than “providing storage space in the basement of the 
Courthouse for the past two years and a dolly to transport the display to and from its 
place of storage,” the County had no other involvement with the nativity scene.40 
 Allegheny County challenged the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit (Pennsylvania).  The Court of Appeals had held that displaying the 
crèche and the Chanukah menorah on government property violated the Establishment 
Clause.  The petitioner’s argument centered on Lynch v. Donnelly, and the precedents set 
by that decision.  The three central arguments made by the petitioners were that the right 
for a government entity to display a nativity crèche or religious symbol was in itself not 
unconstitutional.  Secondly, that the physical location of the items themselves was not 
important, and finally, that the County Christmas display passed both the Lemon Test and 
the Endorsement of Religion Test. 
 The County of Allegheny argued that the mere public displaying of a religious 
item or symbol is not unconstitutional.  Before a decision can be made concerning 
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whether a particular governmental activity violates the Establishment Clause, the activity 
in question must in some way “confer some benefit upon religious activities that advance 
religious practice or have that effect on those that involve the government directly in 
religious exercises.”41  The petitioners reasoned that the “intent of the drafters of the 
Constitution and the historical practice of confirming that intent,” affirmed their belief 
that public manifestations of religion are not inherently unconstitutional.  To support this 
argument they emphasized the words of Chief Justice Warren Burger from Lynch, who 
“set forth a litany of governmental displays that are accepted without thought of a full-
blown constitutional analysis.”42  In addition to this ruling, the petitioners cited Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. (1983), which supported the Court’s recognition of religion 
throughout the country’s history, and as such that the “public manifestation of our 
religious heritage was not the type of conduct sought to be prevented by the 
Establishment Clause.”43 
According to the County of Allegheny, the physical location of the religious items 
in question should be irrelevant.  They believed that “no viewer of the City’s display 
would believe that the purpose is an endorsement of that religion,”44 regardless of the 
location, whether it was on public or privately owned land.  The County of Allegheny 
argued the Supreme Court and other federal courts are opened with an announcement that 
concludes “God save the United States and this Honorable Court.”45  If these and other 
public religious manifestations occur “within” and are “incorporated” in the core 
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functions of government, then surely those that occur “at” the core function of 
government must also be permissible?46   
Finally, the petitioners argued that the religious activities did not violate either the 
Lemon Test or the Endorsement of Religion Test.  The Court had previously ruled in 
Lemon that a “challenged governmental practice would pass constitutional muster if it 
had a secular legislative purpose, if its primary effect neither advanced nor inhibited 
religion, and if it did not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.”47  The County 
of Allegheny believed that, just like Lynch, the purpose of their nativity scene was “to 
celebrate the Holiday and to depict the origins of the season,”48 which were both 
legitimate secular purposes.  Therefore the crèche, though a religious symbol, was 
constitutional because it did not benefit religion, and fell within the bounds of Court 
jurisprudence and the religious tests.  
The arguments of the Court respondents focused on refuting the claims made by 
the County of Allegheny.  First, they petitioned that the Court of Appeals had ruled 
correctly when declaring both religious symbols were a violation of the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment.  Additionally, they argued that the Court of Appeals 
location oriented analysis of the case was correct.  That other examples of public displays 
of religion were irrelevant to this case, and that the presence of a Christmas tree does not 
require or condone a religious display as well.    
 The respondents believed that the locations of the religious symbols in question 
were fundamental when trying to determine the constitutionality of the case.  They 
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believed that “historical examples of religion in our nation’s public life do not affect the 
constitutional analysis in this case.”49  The basis of this argument was that the 
Establishment Clause only examines the effect of any religious symbols at issue, not their 
setting.  The ACLU argued that “location-sensitive reasoning clearly is one of the 
hallmarks of Establishment Clause jurisprudence,”50 and that other decisions and rulings 
did not set any broad precedents or guidelines that extended beyond the specific 
circumstances of those cases.  Consequently, in this case “historical remarks and 
unrelated examples of religion in public life are constitutionally irrelevant.”51 
The ACLU concluded its case by emphasizing the point that the presence of one 
religious symbol did not condone the use of another.  The presence of a Christmas tree 
does not condone a crèche, nor does the presence of a crèche condone the use of a 
menorah.  The “constitutional prohibition against governmental endorsement of one 
religion cannot be avoided by the government’s endorsement of an additional religious 
faith.”52  The respondents concluded that “true religious equality cannot tolerate a 
Nativity Scene and a Chanukah Menorah dominating structures of government power.”53 
 The Court chose to examine whether the display of the crèche and the menorah, 
within their respective setting rather than the Christmas display as a whole, were an 
endorsement of religion.  In a five to four split decision the Court ruled, contrary to its 
1983, Lynch decision, that the petitioners had sent an unmistakable message that it 
supported and promoted Christianity through the use a crèche and was therefore 
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unconstitutional.  However, despite the religious overtones of a menorah, in a six to three 
split decision the Court held that the display of the menorah “in its particular setting was 
a visual symbol for a holiday with a secular dimension.”54  Consequently, the injunction 
against the display of the menorah was reversed.   
Associate Justice Harry Blackmun wrote the majority opinion of the Court.  In it, 
however, he spent the preponderance of his time explaining why Marsh and Lynch do not 
apply in this ruling, while also refuting Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy’s dissention.  
In Marsh, Justice Blackmun explained, the Court relied specifically on the fact that 
Congress authorized legislative prayer at the same time that it produced the Bill of 
Rights.  Additionally, the rationale of the majority opinion in Lynch stated that the 
inclusion of the crèche in the display was “no more an advancement or endorsement of 
religion.”55  However, Blackmun points out, Lynch offered no discernible measure for 
distinguishing between permissible and impermissible endorsements.  Second, the Court 
ruled that any benefit the government’s display of the crèche in Lynch provided to 
religion was “no more than indirect, remote, and incidental,” but never stated how or 
why.  Changing tact, Blackmun also berated Justice Kennedy for what he viewed as 
Kennedy’s effort to legitimize “all practices with no greater potential for an establishment 
of religion” than those “accepted traditions dating back to the Founding,” regardless of 
their history.56  Blackmun called Kennedy’s accusations against the Court that it had 
“latent hostility” and “callous indifference” toward religion, as both offensive and 
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absurd.57  Blackmun concluded by pointing out that a secular state, because of its 
indifference to religion, is not the same as an atheistic or antireligious state.   
 Justice Kennedy in his dissention found that the crèche did not violate the 
Establishment Clause because the “principal or primary effect” of the display was not to 
advance religion within the meaning of Lemon Test.  Kennedy viewed the Court’s 
majority as taking an “unjustified hostility toward religion, a hostility inconsistent with 
our history and our precedents.”58  While finding the crèche display constitutional within 
the definitions of the Lemon Test, Justice Kennedy also took the unusual opportunity in 
his dissent to acknowledge his lack of confidence in the Lemon Test.  Kennedy explained 
that he “did not wish to be seen as advocating, let alone adopting, that test as our primary 
guide in this difficult area.”59  To validate his convictions he cited the “persuasive 
criticism of Lemon” that had emerged from his fellow justices in Edwards v. Aguillard, 
482 U.S. 578 (1987), Associate Justice Antonin Scalia dissenting; Aguilar v. Felton, 473 
U.S. 402 (1985), Justice O'Connor dissenting; Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist dissenting; and, Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Public 
Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976), Associate Justice Byron White concurring in judgment, as 
evidence of the inadequacy of the test.60  Kennedy questioned its usefulness in providing 
“concrete answers to Establishment Clause questions,” instead calling it but a “‘helpful 
signpos[t]’” or “‘guidelin[e]’” in deliberations, rather than a comprehensive test.61  
Additionally, he cited Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), Committee for Public 








Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), and Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668 (1984), as examples where the Court had expressed its “unwillingness to be 
confined to any single test or criterion” when ruling on cases concerning religion.  
Kennedy concluded his thoughts by expressing the need for a “substantial revision of our 
Establishment Clause doctrine.”62  
 Although expressed in the dissent, Justice Kennedy’s points concerning the 
piecemeal jurisprudence of religious law raised troubling issues.  Additionally, the legal 
inconsistencies of Lynch and Allegheny are striking.  Both crèches dated their history 
back at least twenty years, with neither set up with the intention to support religion.  Both 
defendants stored their crèches on government property, and both crèches were a part of a 
greater Christmas display celebrating the American Christmas tradition.  What was most 
concerning was the inconsistent application of the Lemon Test when examining both 
cases.  In Lynch, the justices examined the crèche within the wider context of the display, 
while in Allegheny the justices examined both the crèche and the menorah on their own 
merits.  As such it is no wonder that Justice Kennedy spent considerable time in his 
dissent criticizing the Lemon Test.   
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) 
In 1978, six federal taxpayers challenged New York City’s Title I program and its 
use of federal funds to pay the salaries of public employees who taught in parochial 
schools.  The federal government distributed these funds under Title I of the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act of 1965.  New York City used the funds to provide 
financial assistance to programs that helped meet the education needs of deprived 




children from low income families.  After conflicting rulings by two United States 
District Courts and the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court gained certiorari in 
February, 1984, with a ruling handed down on July 1, 1985.  The appellants before the 
Court for this case sought a review of the judgment handed down by the Court of 
Appeals.  They held that the program was distinct from the parochial schools and that the 
church and state maintained their separation under the Establishment Clause.    
Previous Court rulings had not established a “per se rule absolutely forbidding 
public employees from providing remedial instruction on the premises of religiously 
oriented schools,”63 and no “impressible” degree of entanglement between the church and 
the state existed.64  The appellants argued that Title I, which was enacted in 1965, 
brought “better education to millions of disadvantaged youth who need it most.”65  At the 
time of the suit the program had grown to become the most significant federal 
educational program ever undertaken.  It served more than five million public school and 
almost 200,000 private school children, costing in excess of three billion dollars.66 
Prior to the adoption of its current format, New York City subjected the program 
to numerous forms of trial and error.  Initially, the appellants argued, New York City had 
experimented with two different methods of providing Title I services to private school 
children.  The City tried providing services after regular school hours, first, at public 
schools, and then later at private schools.  However, for numerous reasons attendance 
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was poor in both programs: “both students and teachers were tired after a full school day, 
and parents were concerned about the safety of their children traveling home after dark or 
in inclement weather.”67  Additionally, those programs proved ineffective because, “Title 
I teachers and regular classroom teachers could not communicate concerning the 
educational needs of the Title I students.”68  Subsequently, New York City adopted the 
program in its current form which included on-premises aid.   
  The appellants believed that such a program did not become as an excessive 
entanglement of church and state because under the New York City program, eligible 
students in private schools received five types of Title I remedial services: remedial 
reading, remedial mathematics, reading skills centers, English as a second language, and 
clinical and guidance services.69  None of these services advanced religion; but, instead, 
the services encouraged the core educational function of public schools.  In the past 
tutoring had been conducted off-premises and upheld by the Court through Wolman v. 
Walter, 433 U.S. (1977).  A further safeguard against the advancement of religion 
through the Title I program was the supervision of teachers by public school authorities.  
Public school authorities supervised all their teachers to ensure teachers do not subject or 
impose their personal views on students, including those of a religious nature.70  As such, 
the appellants argued that no chance of religious instruction being advanced through the 
use of tax payer money existed.  
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 For the ACLU, who represented the respondents in this case, the constitutional 
question at hand was simple.  The ACLU did not argue whether the program was 
effective or favored minorities, the fundamental question was whether “the government 
may aid a religious school in performing its core educational function by stationing 
public school teachers in religious schools to teach reading and mathematics skills.”71  
While seeming innocuous, the ACLU argued, such aid to parents and children “inevitably 
aids the institution they have chosen to attend by freeing resources for use in other 
aspects of the religious school’s program.”72  The respondents distinguished between 
previous forms of permissible aid to religious institutions such as bus rides and diagnostic 
testing, as opposed to aiding with the core educational function of religious schools.  The 
ACLU reasoned that if public school teachers could enter parochial schools to teach 
secular skills, as part of the parochial school curriculum, then under the rubric of 
“permissible aid to children, no discernible, much less principled, Establishment Clause 
check will exist on massive aid to parochial schools.”73  Additionally, if government aid 
is permissible for remedial learning, it must also be valid for enrichment programs as 
well.74  According to the ACLU, the logical stopping point of such programs would be 
the creation of joint educational enterprises, with public school teachers “undertaking to 
teach broad areas of the secular curriculum and religious educators accepting 
responsibility for religious instruction.”75  The ACLU concluded that allowing such aid, 
as necessary or beneficial as it is to parochial schools, was unconstitutional because it, 
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“(1) constitutes forbidden aid to a religious institution, (2) creates a risk that religious 
criteria will affect the secular program, and (3) threatens the autonomy of the religious 
institution,” therefore violating the Establishment Clause.76  
 Despite the obvious benefits and success of the Title I program, in another five to 
four split decision, the Court ruled that this program was unconstitutional.  The Court 
believed that an excessive entanglement of church and state in the administration of 
benefits provided under Title I existed.  Consequently, the Court upheld the Court of 
Appeals decision against Title I.  
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993) 
In October, 1987, petitioners Larry and Sandra Zobrest requested Catalina 
Foothills School District provide the service of a certified sign language interpreter for 
their son, the petitioner James Zobrest, a deaf boy then 14 years old.  At the time the 
petitioner attended classes at a Catholic high school, with the request being made in 
connection with the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA).  The Supreme Court 
granted a writ of certiorari to the petitioners to review the judgment of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the 
district court which denied the petitioners request for services.  The Court of Appeals 
ruled that the provision of such a publicly employed interpreter violated the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  
The basis of the argument from the petitioners before the Court was simple.  The 
petitioners believed that under the EHA the Establishment Clause did not prohibit a local 
educational agency from providing the service of a certified sign language interpreter to a 
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deaf child on the premises of the child’s religious school.77  The petitioners argued that 
Salpointe Catholic High School was approved by the Department of Education, State of 
Arizona, and is accredited as a College Preparatory School by North Central Association 
of Colleges and Schools.  The curriculum for graduation consisted of English, Social 
Sciences, Mathematics, Science, Foreign Language, Religion, and five to nine hours per 
year of electives.78  Through the services of an interpreter, James would receive an 
education indistinguishable from a secular viewpoint than that of any other Arizona 
boy.79   
The Zobrest’s argued that a certified sign language interpreter was an individual 
certified by the Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf and, as such, was bound by the 
Registry’s Code of Ethics.  The interpreter’s service would have multiple effects, the 
primary effect being the advancing of the general education of a citizen, not the 
advancement of religion.  To support their case the petitioners argued that prior decisions 
of the Court including the Mueller, Witters and Allen cases sustained the constitutionality 
of allowing the EHA service.  Additionally, the Zobrest’s argued that the decisions of the 
Court in the Lemon, Meek, Wolman, Grand Rapids and Aguilar cases are not precedents 
to the contrary.80  The point of which was that the service would not create an excessive 
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entanglement of church and state, and neither would it encourage governmental 
sponsorship of religion.81    
The petitioners also argued that the decision by the Court of Appeals was flawed 
because of its focus on the fact that furnishing a sign language interpreter to James had a 
primary effect of advancing religion.  The flaw in the Court of Appeals argument was the 
misconception of the term “primary.”82  Governmental actions may have multiple effects, 
however, for the courts to assume that when many benefits existed the “primary” benefit 
is religious is erroneous.  One out of many benefits of a particular governmental action 
may not be held as “primary” simply because it is religious.”83 
  An additional concern raised by the prohibition of such a service was the conflict 
between the constitutional mandate concerning the non-establishment of religion but the 
equally protected right to the free exercise thereof.  The petitioners addressed this 
potential conflict by noting that the logical relationship concerning establishment and free 
exercise was “carefully delineated by this Court almost a half-century ago in Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).”84  In Everson, the Court stated that New Jersey 
could not “in accordance with the Establishment Clause contribute tax-raised funds to the 
support of an institution which teaches the tenets and faith of any church, however, also 
pointed out the limiting effect that the Free Exercise Clause places on the absolutist, or 
secularist, reading of the Establishment Clause.”85  The petitioners argued that the 
principles of Everson applied to their case, since the EHA was a public welfare program 
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for the support of all handicapped children.  They believed that in each case, the public 
service enabled a child to get both a religious and a secular education.  To exclude 
petitioners in the present case from participation in the benefits of EHA, “because of their 
faith . . . would undeniably inhibit them in the exercise of their religion.”86 
 As a co-respondent, the ACLU outlined the arguments against the petitioner’s 
case.  The ACLU’s made two arguments; the Establishment Clause prohibited a state-
employed sign language interpreter from aiding in a pervasively religious education,87 
and that the refusal to provide the same interpreter neither discriminated against nor was 
a burden against the free exercise of religion.88  The respondents grounded their 
constitutional argument in the precedents found in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 373 
(1985), and School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).  Through these 
cases the respondents held that furnishing the requested services violated the 
Establishment Clause by creating an excessive entanglement of church and state.89  
Salpointe’s stated goal was the educating of students in a religious atmosphere, a 
practice consistent with the religious mission of the Roman Catholic Church.90  The 
ACLU argued that “the two functions of secular education and advancement of religious 
values or beliefs are inextricably intertwined throughout the operations of Salpointe.”91  
The presence of a funded state employee in a parochial classroom, “communicating, 
assisting and participating in religious discussions and other sectarian activities,”92 cannot 
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be reconciled with the constitutional requirement that government not participate in the 
religious education of parochial students. 
The respondents also argued that the school district’s failure to provide a sign 
language interpreter was not a burden on the free exercise of religion for the exact 
opposite reason the petitioners argued it was.  The respondents believed that providing an 
interpreter in a sectarian classroom would be providing “direct assistance in the teaching 
and propagation of religious beliefs and ideas.”93  Fundamentally, the respondents 
claimed that the petitioners needed to provide any necessary special assistance to their 
child at a sectarian school at their own expense.  The use of a sign language interpreter 
was available at the local public schools.  Since the Zobrest’s had chosen to send their 
child to a private religious school, they also chose to incur any liabilities as a 
consequence of that decision.  
 After weighing the constitutional arguments and merits of each case, the United 
States Supreme Court, through another five to four split decision, reversed the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals.  The Court found that the Establishment Clause did not prevent 
the respondent school district from furnishing the petitioner with a sign language 
interpreter to facilitate his education at a sectarian school. 
 The conflicting principles surrounding Aguilar and Zobrest are striking.  In 
Aguilar, the Court ruled that public school teachers providing remedial instruction in a 
parochial school was an excessive entanglement of church and state.  This instruction 
constituted an excessive entanglement despite the fact that the remedial teachers would 
only be aiding in the understanding and improved learning of secular subjects by special 
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education learners.  Meanwhile, in Zobrest, similar instructional aid was to be provided to 
help with the understanding and improved learning of an individual special education 
learner.  Ironically, in Zobrest the teaching aid was to help the student learn both secular 
and religious instruction, contrary to the educational bounds found in Aguilar.  Despite 
the many hairs that could be split concerning the finer details of the cases, the interest 
between these two cases does not lay between the cases themselves, but with an ensuing 
case four years later. 
In Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), through another 5-4 split decision, the 
Court overruled their own precedent of Aguilar v. Felton.  In Agostini, the Court decided 
to distinguish its prior decision evaluating the programs that aided the secular activities of 
religious institutions into two categories: “those in which it concluded that the aid 
resulted in an effect that was “indirect, remote, or incidental,” and upheld the aid; and 
those in which it concluded that the aid resulted in “a direct and substantial advancement 
of the sectarian enterprise,” and invalidated the aid.94  The Court held that cases 
subsequent to Aguilar, including Zobrest, had reshaped the approach the Court used to 
assess indoctrination.95   
Using Zobrest as the exemplar, the Court abandoned the presumption that the 
placement of public employees on parochial school grounds resulted in “the 
impermissible effect of state-sponsored indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union 
between government and religion.”96  Additionally, the Court believed that Zobrest had 
refuted the idea that the use of a public employee would aid in the advancement of 
                                                 





religion.  The Court decided that a sign teacher had the same opportunity to inculcate 
religion in the performance of their duties and no evidence existed to suggest they had 
done so.  Consequently, Justice O’Connor stated in her majority opinion when reversing 
the principles of Aguilar v. Felton through Agostini v. Felton, that it was the precedent set 
through Zobrest, and not Agostini, that guided the Court and established the rule by 
decision.97 
The reversal of Aguilar by Agostini casts doubts about the Supreme Court and the 
consistency of its rulings concerning the Establishment Clause.  However, it is the words 
of the Court itself that provide the most fuel to the fire of judicial inconsistencies 
concerning religion.  In summarizing the majority decision on Agostini Justice O’Connor 
stated that the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause law had “significantly changed 
since we decided Aguilar.”98  Such an admission, though common for other topics like 
race, gender, and property, casts more doubt concerning both the fair and equitable 
understanding and application of the Establishment Clause by the Supreme Court.  For 
the Supreme Court to “significantly change” its Establishment Clause law over such a 
short period of time invites questions over both the consistency and the partiality of such 
decisions.  The inconsistent application of the Establishment Clause and the significant 
changes signaled by the Court have not only frustrated the practitioners of the religious 
clauses, but the justices themselves.  As Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the 
religion clauses continues to evolve, the Supreme Court justices see the inconsistencies 
with their decisions and begin to question the validity of their methods.      
 










FRUSTRATION IN COURT 
When Associate Justice Hugo Black considered the arguments of Chambers v. 
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940), he determined that the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporated Amendments One through Eight of the Bill of Rights, and applied them to 
the states.1  Since Black’s deliberations and subsequent decision, the Supreme Court has 
had varying degrees of success applying the Bill of Rights to the states.  While the 
Miranda rights warning from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is often seen as a 
positive application of the Bill of Rights to the states, other areas of application have not 
been met with as much success.  The application of the First Amendment religion clauses 
on the states has encountered stiff resistance and uneven application as the Court 
struggles to find a reliable methodology to apply the religion clauses in a consistent 
manner.  
Consequently, the Supreme Court has devised numerous methods by which to 
apply the religion clauses.  Through the application of the Establishment Clause Test, the 
Lemon Test, the Marsh Test, the Endorsement Test, and the Coercion Test, the Court has 
tried and failed to apply the religion clauses consistently.  More recent Supreme Court 
cases have led to further contradictions and conflicts, with the justices themselves 
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expressing their frustrations over the clear lack of consistency.  These contradictions and 
illogicalities came to a head on June 27, 2005, when the justices handed down the 
decisions in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005), and Van 
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).  Both of these cases dealt with the circumstances 
surrounding the displaying of the Ten Commandments on or within state property, with 
each case resulted in a conflicting opinion.  These conflicting opinions set off a firestorm 
of criticism within the Supreme Court itself, resulting in calls for consistent, long lasting 
reform, and the questioning of whether the Supreme Court even has jurisdiction over any 
matters pertaining to religion itself.   
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)  
By 2005, the twenty-two acres surrounding the Texas State Capitol contained 
seventeen monuments and twenty-one historical markers commemorating the people, 
ideals, and events that compose Texan identity.  One of these monuments was a six feet 
high by three and a half feet wide granite monument of the Ten Commandments.  In 
1961, “the people and youth of Texas by the Fraternal Order of Eagles of Texas,” 
presented this monument to Texas who accepted it by a joint resolution of the House and 
the Senate.2  The joint resolution also authorized the placement of the monument on the 
Capitol grounds.3  In 2003, Thomas Van Orden filed an action to have the monument 
removed from the surroundings of the State Capitol on the grounds that the monument 
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  The United States Court of 
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Appeals for the Fifth District found that the monument did not contravene the 
Establishment Clause.  However, on the same day the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit ruled the opposite conclusion on a case with virtually identical facts.  
Consequently, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari for the two cases to be 
heard.   
The petitioner Thomas Van Orden made two main points.  First, he believed that 
the Ten Commandments monument was a clear expression of a religious message and it 
was also a religious symbol.4  Second, by the state government placing a large monument 
of the Ten Commandments in a prominent public place, such a placement violated the 
Establishment Clause because it favored some religions over others.5  The petitioners 
established their argument through the use of previous rulings found in the lower courts.  
At that time seven Circuit Courts had ruled on the question of whether Ten 
Commandments displays on government property violated the Establishment Clause.  
While three Circuits, including the Fifth Circuit in this case, had rejected the 
constitutional challenges and allowed the monuments to remain, four Circuits had come 
to an opposite conclusion and found the Ten Commandments monuments 
unconstitutional.6 
The petitioners also emphasized the similarities of the cases to add weight to their 
argument.  In almost all of these decisions the Fraternal Order of Eagles placed the 
monuments.  Additionally, all the monuments had been on government property for some 
time, often decades, before the constitutional challenge.  Moreover the symbols on all the 
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monuments were religious in nature and conveyed a religious message; a message that 
could be construed as an endorsement of a particular religion.  
 While the petitioners focused their argument on two main points, they broke these 
points down into four separate violations of the Establishment Clause.  First, the state 
government discriminated in favor of some religious denominations and sects over others 
because of the writing, size of the lettering, and the prefatory words, “I AM the LORD 
thy GOD,” which emphasized a religious message over a secular one.7  Additionally, 
different religions had varying versions of the Ten Commandments and the choice of a 
version prefers some religions over others.8  Second, the government had no permissible 
secular purpose when placing the Ten Commandments within the grounds of the State 
Capitol.  The Supreme Court had held repeatedly that government actions violated the 
Establishment Clause if there was not an actual secular purpose.”9  Third, the Ten 
Commandments monument had the impermissible effect of symbolically endorsing 
religion.  The petitioners argued that, contrary to common belief, a careful review of 
American history found little influence of the Ten Commandments in the forming of 
American law.  Subsequently, any message was religious in nature since it had little in 
common with secular American culture.  Finally, the message of the monument is not 
“minimal religious content,” but instead the words “I AM the LORD thy GOD” and the 
explicitly religious commandments projected a religious message.10  According to the 
petitioners, these four factors demonstrated that the monument’s location, context, and 
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content constituted an impermissible symbolic endorsement of religion.  They believed 
that the Ten Commandments monument expressed a religious message and that these 
religious beliefs favored a particular religion over others through the displaying of the 
Decalogue.    
 The respondents to this case based their defense on four arguments.  First, they 
believed that the context of the monument was not an endorsement of religion and thus 
did not violate the Establishment Clause.11  Secondly, the “history and ubiquity” of the 
monument, and other monuments across the nation, did not violate the Establishment 
Clause.12  Third, the monument survived any test given to it that had been devised in 
conjunction with the Establishment Clause,13 and finally, the monument itself presented a 
far lesser threat to the establishment of religion than practices and displays already 
condoned by the Court.14 
The respondents also argued that the context of the monument was not religious 
in nature through an extrapolation of the history and ubiquity of the display.  Dating back 
to 1888, the people of Texas dedicated the Texas Capitol and its grounds, and three years 
later the first monument was built on the grounds and dedicated to the Texans who died 
at the Alamo.15  By 2005, seventeen monuments and twenty-one historical markers 
adorned the Capitol Grounds, “together commemorating people, events, and ideals that 
have contributed to the history, diversity, and culture of Texas.”16  Concerning the 
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monument in question, the display had stood for over four decades before anyone took 
offense to it.  By statute, Texas defined the monument as a “museum” and maintained it 
by a professional curator, along with the other monuments on the grounds.17  
The respondents argued that under Lynch and Allegheny, the overall history, 
context, and surroundings are critical to determining a display’s constitutionality.  If, 
aware of that full background and history, the reasonable observer would not perceive the 
monument to be a government endorsement of religion, then the monument is 
constitutional.  In a unanimous verdict the Court of Appeals supported the argument 
concerning the history and background, and ruled that the monument met the 
constitutional standard.18  
The Court of Appeals agreed that the context of the monument was a 
governmental acknowledgement of “the substantial contribution of the Ten 
Commandments to the development of Western civilization and legal codes.”19  No 
history or evidence existed that demonstrated an impermissible purpose, but rather the 
Ten Commandments monument served at least two permissible purposes.  First, the state 
accepted it from the Fraternal Order of Eagles in 1961, for the purpose of commending 
their work with youth.  Second, the state placed the monument on the grounds for the 
purpose of acknowledging the Ten Commandments’ historical impact on American and 
Texan law and culture.20   
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To further support their argument of history and ubiquity, the respondents drew 
on the   
“countless monuments, medallions, plaques, sculptures, seals, frescoes, and friezes – 
including, of course, this Court’s own courtroom frieze that commemorate the 
Decalogue.”21  They claimed nothing in the Constitution required these historic artifacts 
to be “chiseled away or erased.”22  The Framers of the Constitution considered and 
rejected a rule that would have prohibited any governmental activity “touching religion,” 
and since the monument had neither the purpose nor the effect of endorsing religion, it 
remained consistent with the Court’s precedents, and should be upheld.23 
Finally, the respondents argued, that by forcing the State Preservation Board to 
remove only one of the seventeen monuments on the Capitol Grounds because that 
monument contains a text with religious significance would be tantamount to an act of 
discrimination and hostility.24  The Constitution mandates the accommodation, not 
merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any.  To remove a 
monument, regardless of its religious message, would contravene the Establishment 
Clause and invalidate its historical significance.  
Upon ruling on the case, the United States Supreme Court held that the Lemon 
Test was not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that had been erected on 
the Capitol grounds.  Instead, the Court focused on both the nature of the monument and 
its history.  Consequently, the Court ruled, by a split majority of five to four, that the 
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placement of the Ten Commandments monument on the State Capitol grounds was “a far 
more passive use of those texts than the mandatory placement of the text in elementary 
school classrooms.”25  Citizens had walked by the monument for a number of years 
before bringing this lawsuit.  Additionally, Texas had treated its Capitol grounds 
monuments as representing the several strands in the State's political and legal history.  
The inclusion of the Ten Commandments monument in this group had a dual 
significance, partaking of both religion and government.  Therefore the monument passed 
Constitutional examination. 
McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) 
 On November 18, 1999, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of 
Kentucky filed a complaint against McCreary and Pulaski Counties.  The genesis of this 
complaint were displays in each county’s courthouses of the Ten Commandments, which 
the ACLU believed violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  Shortly 
after the lawsuit, the counties changed their displays to include another eight documents, 
in addition to the Ten Commandments.  The counties entitled these new displays, 
“Foundations of American Law and Government,” with the express intention of 
educating citizens about Kentucky’s “precedent legal code.”26  The ACLU continued its 
request for a preliminary injunction and on May 5, 2000, the District Court ordered the 
immediate removal of the displays.  The defendants then modified the displays a second 
time in an effort to bring it within constitutional boundaries.  This time the displays 
included eleven equally sized documents placed in equal sized frames, with an 
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explanatory document stating that the “display contains documents that played a 
significant role in the foundation of our system of law and government.”27   
After the construction of the third display, a second motion was filed for a 
preliminary injunction, which was granted by the District Court which again ordered the 
displays to be removed.  The defendants filed a motion with the Sixth Circuit Court, 
which affirmed the lower court’s ruling in a split decision.  The Circuit Court ruled that 
the defendants needed to show “historical and an analytical connection” of the Ten 
Commandments with the other documents.28  The defendants held that the requirement of 
a historical and analytical connection conflicted with precedence set by both the Supreme 
Court and four other Circuit Courts.  Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted a writ of 
certiorari for the case.   
 The petitioner’s arguments before the Supreme Court contained three main points.  
First, they believed that the display did not violate the Establishment Clause.29  Secondly, 
they argued that the Lemon Test should be overruled or modified for governmental 
acknowledgement of religion,30 and finally, an objective test should be adopted for 
government acknowledgements of religion.31  The base argument of the petitioners 
concerning the displaying of the Ten Commandments was that they “have profoundly 
influenced the formation of Western legal thought and the formation of our country.”32  
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The influence that they cited as supporting this claim was that they were foundational to 
the United States through the Declaration of Independence.  In the Declaration it 
declares, “that all men are created equal” and that they are “endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable rights,”33 this Creator being the same Creator that issued the Ten 
Commandments.  The petitioners also argued that the validity of such a statement is 
irrelevant.  The Court is not required to “determine whether the secular purpose is 
morally or politically correct – because the government acts neutrally so long as the 
purpose is one other than advancing religion.”34  Checking the validity of such statements 
was not necessary despite the fact that, the petitioners contended, many historians and 
legal scholars agreed that the Ten Commandments influenced American law.35 
 The petitioners also believed that the Lemon Test should be overruled “since the 
test is unworkable and has fostered excessive confusion in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.”36  Their evidence for the Lemon Test’s unworkability was their belief that 
the foundations display passed every test developed by the Court.  Under Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the secular purpose was “to educate the public about 
some of the documents that played a significant role in the foundations of our system of 
law and government.”37  They argued that the mere presence of the Ten Commandments 
did not transform an otherwise secular display into a religious one.38  The display is about 
the law, and like many other legal documents in history, the Decalogue is law and has 
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influenced American law.  The petitioners argued that no reasonable observer would 
consider the “Foundations Display” an endorsement of religion.  Such an observer, would 
be aware of the historical influence of the Ten Commandments, and would view them in 
context with the other legal documents.  The Commandments are only one of eleven 
documents on display, and viewed in light of history and ubiquity, no objective observer 
would conclude the display favors or establishes religion.39   
The third point of the petitioners’ argument was that the Establishment Clause test 
announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, has caused “hopeless confusion,” with many members 
of the Court having voiced opposition to its continued use.40  As an example they cited 
the dissent in Edwards v. Aguilard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987), where Justice Scalia, 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking of the Lemon test remarked that, 
Our cases interpreting and applying the purpose test have made such a maze of 
the Establishment Clause that even the most conscientious governmental official 
can only guess what motives will be held unconstitutional.  We have said 
essentially the following: Government may not act with the purpose of advancing 
religion, except when forced to do so by the Free Exercise Clause (which is now 
and then); or when eliminating existing governmental hostility to religion (which 
exists sometimes); or even when merely accommodating governmentally 
uninhibited religious practices, except that at some point (it is unclear where) 
intentional accommodation results in the fostering of religion, which is of course 
unconstitutional.41  
 
Justice Rehnquist further added that the purpose prong of the Lemon test is not “a proper 
interpretation of the Constitution,” and has “no basis in the history” of the First 
Amendment.42  Rehnquist concluded by saying that the test “has proven mercurial in 
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application,” and should be abandoned.43  The petitioners continued, declaring that the 
Court has acknowledged that no “rigid caliper” or “single test” existed and that Lemon 
was only meant as a guideline; however, this “guideline” had continued to overshadow 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.44  Consequently, the petitioners argued that the 
Lemon Test should be abandoned.  It had fractured the Court and caused scholars and 
litigators to wonder if any hope for consistency existed.45  The petitioners concluded by 
observing that many “conflicting decisions on virtually identical fact patterns as there are 
judges to decide them” exist.46 
 The respondents argument centered on two main points.  First, that the Ten 
Commandments contained and expressed a religious message,47 and second, that the 
inclusion of the Ten Commandments in the courthouse displays had the impermissible 
purpose and effect of endorsing religion.48  In arguing these points the respondents drew 
on the original intentions of the Court Houses for displaying the Ten Commandments.  
The Kentucky ACLU argued that at first the courthouses had displayed only a framed 
copy of the Ten Commandments.”49  After the initial legal action from the respondents 
the counties then passed a resolution to post the Ten Commandments with additional 
documents and a sign that read, “The precedent legal code upon which the civil and 
criminal codes of the Commonwealth of Kentucky are founded.”50  However, the 
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portions of those additional documents selected only included those documents 
references to God or the Bible.51  After the continuance of legal action the counties then 
modified the displays to include several other documents, with the acknowledged 
understanding that they were doing so “in an attempt to bring the display[s] within the 
parameters of the First Amendment and to insulate themselves from suit.”52 
 To negate previous precedents from the Court concerning religious cases, the 
respondents presented four arguments.  First, governmental Ten Commandment displays 
were new and far less ubiquitous than the Pledge of Allegiance or the national motto.53  
Second, while the Ten Commandments are not worship or prayer in themselves, they 
have as their purpose “placing the [reader] in a penitent state of mind, or [are] intended to 
create a spiritual communion or invoke divine aid, [thus] stray[ing] from the legitimate 
secular purposes of solemnizing an event and recognizing a shared religious history.”54  
Third, the Ten Commandments displays referred to particular religions by emphasizing 
that document itself, and by choosing text and then emphasizing ideas that reflected deep 
theological and historical rifts.  Finally, each county’s displays had far more than 
“minimal” religious content.  The displays contained between fourteen and seventeen 
Biblical verses (depending on a religions’ numbering and organizing systems), and 
recited core religious beliefs of Christians and Jews.  Additionally, they capitalize the 
word “Lord” in every usage making them more of a religious proclamation to the 
reasonable observer.55  In summary, the ACLU argued that the purpose and effect of the 
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counties’ actions throughout the litigation process, including the posting of the second 
and third displays, was meant to advance religion.  Accordingly, the respondents believed 
that for this reason, the third displays violated the First Amendment’s Establishment 
Clause.56   
In a five to four split decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court 
judgments, agreeing with the respondents that all of the displays violated the 
Establishment Clause because they did not have a secular legislative purpose.  Even 
though the third displays may have been within the bounds of the Establishment Clause, 
the Court also considered the progression leading up to the third display.  Additionally, 
the Court rejected the counties' request to abandon Lemon's purpose test or to truncate the 
Court's enquiry into purpose.  
 When taken at face value the most bewildering contrast between these two cases 
is not that they were similar in circumstance or argument.  Nor is it that despite their 
similarities the decisions handed down were different.  The most bewildering aspect of 
these two cases is that the justices handed down these decisions on the same day.  
Although a convincing argument might be made about the inconsistency of the decisions 
based on the merits of each case and the application of the Constitution, it is the remarks 
in both the majority and dissenting opinions of each case that speak to the inadequacy of 
the current application of the Establishment Clause.   
 In the opinion of the Court for Van Orden, Chief Justice Rehnquist identified the 
conflicting views concerning religious cases.  On the one side, Rehnquist stated, it was 
impossible to ignore the “strong role played by religion and religious traditions 
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throughout our Nation’s history;” yet, on the other side, the Court must concern itself 
with “the principle that governmental intervention in religious matters can itself endanger 
religious freedom.”57  Rehnquist then reiterated these points stating that the Court should 
“neither abdicate our responsibility to maintain a division between church and state,” 
while striving to avoid demonstrating “a hostility to religion by disabling the government 
from in some ways recognizing our religious heritage.”58  In illustrating the inadequacies 
of this balancing act Rehnquist outlined over the previous twenty-five years the 
inconsistencies surrounding Establishment Clause rulings.  
 The inconsistencies that Rehnquist identified included the random application of 
the Lemon Test, such as Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38 (1985) which applied the test, as 
opposed to Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), which did not.59  To further 
compound the confusion surrounding the Court’s decisions, it was decided just two years 
after Lemon, in Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 741 (1973), that the three prongs which 
make up the test would be “no more than helpful signposts.”60  Subsequently, many of 
the Court’s more recent cases have simply ignored the Lemon test, including Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, 536 U. S. 639 (2002), and Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 
533 U. S. 98 (2001).61  Rehnquist then rounds out this conflicting piece of analysis in the 
Court’s opinion by conceding that sometimes the Lemon Test was applied only after 
concluding “that the challenged practice was invalid under a different Establishment 
                                                 







Clause test.”62  Rehnquist then, echoing the words of Justice Kennedy from Lynch v. 
Donnelly, concluded this line of thought by stating “whatever may be the fate of the 
Lemon Test in the larger scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence,” implying 
through the use of the word “whatever” that the Court’s confidence in the test is marginal 
at best.63  
Speaking to the Van Orden decision, Rehnquist explained that the Supreme Court 
had always recognized the role that God had played in America’s heritage.64  
Consequently, he observed, it would be “incongruous to interpret [the Establishment 
Clause] as imposing more stringent First Amendment limits on the states than the 
draftsmen imposed on the Federal Government.”65  Rehnquist then cited as an example 
the Court’s decision to uphold laws which originated from one of the Ten 
Commandments; the sale of merchandise on Sunday.   
Given the Court’s own acknowledgement that Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
is flawed, it is therefore confusing that the Court, on the same day, would uphold the 
displaying of one Decalogue as a historical monument, while declaring another 
unconstitutional.  Such a contradiction if further highlighted by the fact that in one case 
(Van Orden) the Lemon Test was not applied while in the other case it was.  Additionally, 
the unconstitutional monument bore a title stating “display contains documents that 
played a significant role in the foundation of our system of law and government.”66  An 
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acknowledgement the Court made when considering the constitutionality of the Van 
Orden case.  
The conflicting decisions of Van Orden and McCreary County become even more 
confusing when the Court acknowledged that a frieze of Moses “has stood, holding two 
tablets that reveal portions of the Ten Commandments written in Hebrew,” in addition to 
a, “24-foot-tall sculpture, depicting, among other things, the Ten Commandments and a 
cross, [which] stands outside the federal courthouse that houses both the Court of 
Appeals and the District Court for the District of Columbia.  Moses is also prominently 
featured in the Chamber of the United States House of Representatives.”67  Adding 
further confusion to the two decisions was the Court’s declaration that Moses was a 
lawgiver as well as a religious leader, and “simply having religious content or promoting 
a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment 
Clause.”68  
 In concurring, Associate Justice Antonin Scalia added further weight to the 
confusion surrounding Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  Scalia commented that he 
believed Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion “accurately reflects our current Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence—or at least the Establishment Clause jurisprudence we currently 
apply some of the time.”69  Scalia conceded through this admission that Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence was far from settled or consistent, and subject to change.  Scalia 
finished this line of thought by lamenting his still elusive goal of adopting “an 
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Establishment Clause jurisprudence that is in accord with our Nation’s past and present 
practices, and that can be consistently applied.”70 
 In a separate concurrence, Associate Justice Clarence Thomas retraced the words 
of Justice Scalia, longing for a consistent standard for Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.  Thomas observed that the Van Orden case would be easy to rule upon, “if 
the Court were willing to abandon the inconsistent guideposts it has adopted for 
addressing Establishment Clause challenges.”71  According to Thomas, a consistent 
standard could only occur when the Court returned “to the original meaning of the 
Clause.”72  According to Justice Thomas, however, returning to the original meaning of 
the “Clause’s text and history,” meant overturning the incorporation of the religion 
clauses in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and Everson v. Board of 
Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).73  Thomas believed that if the amendment was not 
applicable to the states when first adopted, then it should not be forced upon the states 
now.  
 Justice Thomas conceded that the likelihood of incorporation being reversed was 
improbable at best.  Therefore, Thomas offered a compromise by instead focusing on 
“the original meaning of the word “establishment,” rather than the various approaches the 
Court now uses.74  Thomas believed that the Framers understood establishment to mean 
coercion of “religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of 
penalty,” such as mandatory observance or mandatory payment of taxes supporting 








ministers.75  Ultimately Justice Thomas saw the Court’s jurisdiction, application, and 
decisions concerning cases of religion to be flawed.  By returning to the Founders 
original intent and meaning of the religion clauses, he believed the Court would: 
avoid the pitfalls present in the Court’s current approach to such challenges. This 
Court’s precedent elevates the trivial to the proverbial “federal case,” by making 
benign signs and postings subject to challenge. Yet even as it does so, the Court’s 
precedent attempts to avoid declaring all religious symbols and words of 
longstanding tradition unconstitutional, by counterfactually declaring them of 
little religious significance. Even when the Court’s cases recognize that such 
symbols have religious meaning, they adopt an unhappy compromise that fails 
fully to account for either the adherent’s or the nonadherent’s beliefs, and 
provides no principled way to choose between them. Even worse, the incoherence 
of the Court’s decisions in this area renders the Establishment Clause 
impenetrable and incapable of consistent application. All told, this Court’s 
jurisprudence leaves courts, governments, and believers and nonbelievers alike 
confused—an observation that is hardly new.76  
 
Justice Thomas saw the Court’s handling of the religion clauses, and in particular the 
Establishment Clause, as fraught with futility and incapable of consistent application.  
Thomas then concluded his frustration laced concurrence by pointing to the inconsistency 
of the decisions the Court reached today in “this case and in McCreary County v. 
American Civil Liberties Union of Ky.,” which Thomas believed had only compounded 
the confusion.77 
 Writing the opinion of the Court in the McCreary County decision, Associate 
Justice David Souter cited the Lemon Test as the standard by which the case was decided.  
Souter noted that one of the three prongs of the Lemon Test was to determine the secular 
purpose of the case in question.  Drawing on the previous two earlier efforts to establish 
the display, the Court found that the Ten Commandments violated the Lemon Test, since 






it would have been hard for an “objective observer” to not concede that the initial 
purpose of the display was the advancement of religion.  Given the validity of this 
statement in light of the Lemon Test criteria, it becomes much harder to understand the 
Court’s decision in Lynch v. Donnelly, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).  Like McCreary County, 
Lynch was decided through the use of the Lemon Test.  After the initiation of the lawsuit, 
the mayor vowed to fight against the ACLU’s attempt to take “Christ out of Christmas.”78  
Yet the Court in Lynch allowed the displaying of the Christmas crèche, despite the 
religious actions of the mayor.  Souter conceded the inconsistencies of the Court’s 
decision, commenting that in Establishment cases, “trade-offs are inevitable, and an 
elegant interpretative rule to draw the line in all the multifarious situations is not to be 
had.”79 
 In his dissent, Justice Scalia lambasted Souter’s “trade-offs” as nothing more than 
the Lemon Test being used to take “seemingly simple mandates” and have them 
“manipulated to fit whatever result the Court aimed to achieve.”80  Scalia reiterated his 
desire to see the Lemon Test abandoned.  In doing so, he cut to the heart of the matter 
concerning the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction and jurisprudence over religious matters.  
Scalia observed that the Founding Fathers would “surely regard it as a bitter irony that 
the religious values they designed those Clauses to protect have now become so 
distasteful to this Court that if they constitute anything more than a subordinate motive 
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for government action they will invalidate it.”81  Scalia reiterated the feelings of Justice 
Thomas in his Van Orden concurrence.  The Founding Fathers did not leave matters of 
religion to the federal government, nor did they intend the federal courts to prescribe 
what can and cannot be practiced as a part of one’s religious devotion.  By applying, 
sometimes avoiding, and then ignoring the Lemon Test, Scalia observed that the Court's 
invocation of the Lemon Test is “like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that 
repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad after being repeatedly killed and 
buried, Lemon stalks our establishment clause jurisprudence once again.”82  
 Tremendous struggles exist among the Court’s members trying to find the right 
balance concerning religious issues.  As historian Timothy L. Hall observed, the “courts 
and commentators have been incorrigible poachers in the preserve of American 
history,”83 erecting claims and precedence for First Amendment jurisprudence based on 
“shockingly scanty” historical evidence, both for and against religious issues.84  In a 
previous ruling Justice O’Connor sought to resolve the issue by adopting an objective 
religions test.  She suggested four preliminary categories: (1) government action targeted 
at individuals or groups, (2) government (acknowledgment or) speech on religious topics, 
(3) government decisions involving religious doctrine and religious law, and (4) 
governmental delegations of power to religious bodies.85  Unfortunately, the problem 
with the objective religions test is that it conflicts with the original purpose for the 
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Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses’.  By suggesting that the Court’s decisions 
concerning religion should fall into four main categories, one of which includes 
“government decisions involving religious doctrine and religious law,” the Court would 
be deciding what is and is not “religious doctrine and law.”  By accepting such a 
responsibility the Supreme Court would in effect be establishing a state religion and 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; the very two purposes the Establishment and Free 
Exercise clauses were designed to protect.    
  Law professors Russell L. Weaver and Donald E. Lively in their book, 
Understanding the First Amendment, predict that “given the considerable dissatisfaction 
with established principles” and the “failure of the Court to unify in support of an 
alternative,” the Establishment Clause standards have an uncertain future.86  If Supreme 
Court jurisprudence is going to become consistent, and the religion clauses are going to 
be consistently enforced, then a far more general and fairer way of deciding cases of 
religious scope needs to be adopted.  The Court has taken the first step by acknowledging 
that the current jurisprudence concerning religious cases is not adequate.  Justice Thomas 
has taken a much bolder and much more “constitutional” step by questioning the Court’s 
jurisdiction concerning religious matters.  If an adequate compromise is to be made, it is 
probable that the solution will be found somewhere between the jurisprudence and 
jurisdiction of the Court’s religion cases.    
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THE SEARCH FOR A CONSISTENT STANDARD 
 
The application of both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause to 
the states following Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and Everson v. Board 
of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), exposed the Supreme Court to widespread criticism.  
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and jurisdiction has become the subject of heavy 
criticism as it sought to forge a more consistent and more definitive role concerning 
religion and its relationship with local, state, and the federal government.  The justices 
themselves have acknowledged that current jurisprudence concerning religious cases is 
not adequate.  A far more general and balanced way of deciding cases of a religious 
nature needs to be developed.  Associate Justice Clarence Thomas has facilitated a 
potential change towards the way the Supreme Court decides cases concerning religion 
by questioning the Court’s jurisdiction over religious matters.  Thus, because of the 
inconsistencies found in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and because of the Court’s 
reluctance to cede jurisdiction, combined with the institution’s treatment of matters 
pertaining to religion, all have made it clear that both the idea and the principle of 
“separation of church and state” needs to be reevaluated and reapplied, by the justices, 
scholars, and the public.   
Many Supreme Court rulings exist that highlight the inconsistencies found in the 
Court’s application of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First 
Amendment.  It is unfortunate that the consistency and absolutism that the Supreme 
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Court has sought to establish has been fraught with contradictions and unpredictability, 
even in cases where the justices thought they had crafted a clear rule.  These 
contradictions in jurisprudence have become apparent when analyzing the Court’s 
rationale behind cases similar in nature but different in their decisions.  Some of these 
decisions include the exhibition of Christmas crèches between Lynch v. Donnelly, 463 
U.S. 783 (1983), and County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 
573 (1989).  Additionally, analysis of Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), and 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993), concerning the use of 
public money being used to help enhance the education of disadvantaged learners, and 
McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005), and Van Orden v. Perry, 
545 U.S. 677 (2005), regarding the displaying of the Ten Commandments on or within 
state premises, further highlight the Supreme Court’s inconsistent, even contradictory, 
jurisprudence concerning this issue of religious separation.   
In Lynch v. Donnelly and County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh 
Chapter, the Court decided on cases that addressed religious Christmas “decorations” in 
state sponsored public displays, specifically the use of a Christmas crèche, and in 
Allegheny a Chanukah menorah as well.  In Lynch the Court upheld the use of a crèche 
while in Allegheny the Court viewed the use of a crèche unconstitutional, but not the 
menorah.  The most confusing and concerning aspects of these cases, outside of the 
contrary conclusions of the Court, was how the justices reached their conclusions.  In 
Lynch, the justices examined the crèche within the wider context of the display, while in 
Allegheny the justices examined both the crèche and the menorah on their own merits.  
Despite the similarities of the circumstances, the inconsistent application of the Lemon 
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Test, a test devised by the Court to consistently determine the constitutionality of a 
decision concerning religion, resulted in the preservation of one display while the justices 
condemned the display in the other.  It is not surprising that Associate Justice Anthony 
Kennedy in his dissent of Allegheny stated that he “did not wish to be seen as advocating, 
let alone adopting, that test as our primary guide in this difficult area.”1  Additionally and 
correctly, Kennedy questioned the Lemon Test’s usefulness in providing “concrete 
answers to Establishment Clause questions.”2   
 The cases of Aguilar v. Felton and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 
focused on the use of public money being used to help enhance the learning of 
disadvantaged learners in parochial schools.  Despite the inconsistency of the decisions 
between Aguilar and Zobrest, which permitted the use of public funds in one case but not 
the other, it was a later case concerning the same issue that called into question the 
consistency and reasonableness of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  In Agostini v. 
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), the Court overruled their own precedent of Aguilar v. 
Felton.  In Agostini, the Court decided to distinguish its prior decision evaluating 
programs that aided the secular activities of religious institutions into two categories: 
indirect and direct aid.3  The greatest threat to religious freedom derived from this 
decision, however, is not the decision itself, but the Court’s admission through Associate 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor that the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause law had 
“significantly changed since we decided Aguilar.”4  For the Supreme Court to 
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“significantly change” its Establishment Clause law over such a short period of time 
invites questions over both the consistency and the partiality of such decisions.  In effect, 
O’Connor setup a slippery slope argument: if this change, then what else? 
 The cases of McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky and Van Orden v. Perry, 
dealt with similar circumstances surrounding the displaying of the Ten Commandments 
on state property and within state buildings.  The obvious inconsistency of these cases is 
the conflicting decisions of the Court, despite being given on the same day, concerning 
the same issues.  However, it is the opinions given by the justices on these cases that shed 
most of the light regarding the Court’s frustrations and inconsistency with issues 
concerning religion.  In the opinion of the Court for Van Orden, Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist identified the conflicting views concerning religious cases.  Rehnquist 
observed that it was impossible to ignore the “strong role played by religion and religious 
traditions throughout our Nation’s history;” yet, on the other side, the Court must concern 
itself with “the principle that governmental intervention in religious matters can itself 
endanger religious freedom.”5  Rehnquist also illustrated the inadequacies of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence over the previous twenty-five years identifying multiple 
inconsistencies surrounding Establishment Clause rulings.  
 In concurring, Associate Justice Antonin Scalia added further weight to the 
confusion surrounding Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  Scalia commented that he 
believed Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion “accurately reflects our current Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence—or at least the Establishment Clause jurisprudence we currently 
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apply some of the time.”6  Scalia finished his line of thought by lamenting his still elusive 
goal of adopting “an Establishment Clause jurisprudence that is in accord with our 
Nation’s past and present practices, and that can be consistently applied.”7  In a separate 
concurrence, Justice Thomas retraced the words of Justice Scalia, longing for a consistent 
standard for Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  Thomas observed that the Van Orden 
case would have been easy to rule upon, “if the Court were willing to abandon the 
inconsistent guideposts it has adopted for addressing Establishment Clause challenges.”8  
According to Thomas, a consistent standard could only occur when the Court returned “to 
the original meaning of the Clause.”9  Ultimately, Justice Thomas saw the Court’s 
handling of the religion clauses, and in particular the Establishment Clause, as fraught 
with futility and incapable of consistent application.10 
 Despite Justice Thomas’ desire to return to the original meaning of the religion 
clauses, scholars acknowledge that historical precedence concerning the religion clauses 
cannot be fully extrapolated to satisfactorily accommodate every historian, lawyer, or 
potential petitioner before the Court.  Presently, historical scholarship dealing with the 
background and enactment of the First Amendment is at an impasse with separationists 
and accommodationists defending their own position while being convinced about the 
erroneousness of their opponents.  Unfortunately, both groups adhere to their respective 
positions by ignoring “massive amounts of countervailing evidence and by engaging in 








determined historical selectivity.”11  Consequently, judicial interpretation of the First 
Amendment’s religion clauses are in a state of disarray.12  
These historical inaccuracies have fostered a lack of understanding and an 
inaccurate contextualization of religious and political thought during the late 1700s, with 
“sound bites” of the Founding Fathers used to justify, dismiss, and deny state and federal 
laws throughout the country.  Separationists claim that the Bible and religion did not play 
a significant role in the political and legal thoughts of the Founding Fathers.  However, a 
statistical study of their political writings from 1760 to 1805, shows that well over half of 
all their citations were from the Bible, Montesquieu, Blackstone, and Locke, in that order 
of priority.13  Consequently, as historian Thomas Curry pointed out, some of the 
conclusions modern scholars have drawn about the meaning of the First Amendment are 
logical, plausible and reasonable, but those conclusions are not necessarily historical.14  
Today a few Founding Fathers hold popular positions in the imagination of 
contemporary society and have been afforded prominent, but historically inaccurate 
influence when tracing the meaning and history of the First Amendment.  These historical 
inaccuracies have helped create a distorted history of First Amendment jurisprudence.  Of 
the justices who have written at least one religion clause opinion, “seventy-six percent 
have appealed to the founders or founding era history to shine light on the meaning of the 
religion clauses,  and every one of the twenty-three justices who have authored more than 
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four religion clause opinions have done so.”15  Despite Madison and Jefferson’s 
unorthodox religious opinions, and their incongruent religious views relative to the 
majority of Americans in the late eighteenth century, seventy-nine percent of the justices 
have appealed to their writings, while “only 21 percent of their appeals have been to one 
of thirty-one other founders.”16  Even the term “Founding Father” is ambiguous because, 
depending on the context of the user, it can exclude some of the most influential thinkers 
of the revolutionary era.  Scholars of church and state matters have exempted people like 
Roger Sherman, as well as many others who drafted and ratified the Constitution and 
First Amendment.  However, despite these misgivings an effort must be made to advance 
the jurisprudence of the religion clauses since all parties involved, including the Supreme 
Court justices themselves, agree that the status quo cannot remain the law of the land and 
be so inconsistent in its application.      
Despite Justice Thomas’ suggestion to the contrary,17 one area the Supreme Court 
justices are unlikely to concede is their jurisdiction over religious affairs.  Beginning with 
Associate Justice Hugo Black, and then being reaffirmed by subsequent Court rulings 
concerning religion, many justices have baulked at the idea that religion as a facet of 
American life and legislation might be beyond their legal jurisdiction.  The modern 
understanding that religion was not written into the Constitution to keep religion out of 
the government is accurate.  However, it is equally accurate that religion was not written 
into the Constitution to keep government out of religion.  The passage of the Bill of 
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Rights was not meant to undermined this idea; instead, the states ratified the Bill of 
Rights to reinforce a long held colonial belief that people are free to worship God 
however they wanted, or not at all.18  For this reason the Bill of Rights was not originally 
applicable to the states because religious issues did not fall within the sphere of the 
federal government’s jurisdiction.    
In writing for a unanimous Court in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833), 
Chief Justice Marshall stated that the “amendments contain no expression indicating an 
intention to apply them to the State governments.  This court cannot so apply them.”19  
Marshall further stated of the Bill of Rights that, “No language can be more general; yet 
the demonstration is complete that it applies solely to the government of the United 
States.”20  However, the states submitted large portions of legal power to the jurisdiction 
of the federal government, and by default the Bill of Rights, following the passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Despite this shift in jurisdiction the historical principles 
concerning religion should remain true as Associate Justice John Rutledge noted, “no 
provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given context by its generating 
history than the religious clause of the First Amendment.  It is at once the refined product 
and the terse summation of that history.”21   
Since the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and the expansion of judicial 
rights by the federal government over the states, the United States Supreme Court has 
made decisions concerning religion that historian Mark Noll described as founded on 
                                                 
18 Joseph Bondy, How Religious Liberty was written into the American Constitution: A 
History (Syracuse: Oberlander Press, 1927), 9. 
19 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
20 Ibid. 
21 Noll, The Forgotten Founders, xvi. 
130 
 
“abstract logical deductions drawn from statements made at the time and on textual 
analysis of wording carried out apart from their historical context.”22  The inconsistencies 
surrounding the history of the First Amendment and its subsequent application “was 
precipitated in 1947, when the Supreme Court set a direction for discussion of the First 
Amendment,”23 after Justice Black’s majority opinion regarding Everson.  At odds with 
the First Amendment’s history, and that of religion and politics in American history in 
general,24 Black declared that the clause against the establishment of religion by law “was 
intended to erect a wall of separation between church and State.”25  Instead of viewing the 
amendment as depriving the government of power, and, in particular, the federal 
government, Black interpreted the amendment as conferring on government “enormous 
authority to determine the sphere of religious practice and confine it behind a 
metaphorical wall of the State’s making.”26  As a consequence of Black’s opinion, 
historian John Wilson described the Supreme Court’s discussions and debates 
surrounding the meaning of the First Amendment as carrying them “even farther from its 
historical source and even deeper into the thickets of confusion.”27  This confusion has 
spilled over into many conflicting and confusing Court decisions.  Despite the good 
intentions of the Supreme Court justices, judicial interpretation on both the Establishment 
and Free Exercises Clauses of the Bill of Rights, has resulted in uncertainty and 
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inconsistency; an ironic outcome since the Founding Founders designed the clauses in 
order to avoid such situations. 
The consequences of the religion clauses falling under the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, and subsequently all lower courts because of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
has set a dangerous precedent.  That precedence is the ideological difference between 
religious tolerance and religious liberty, debated by James Madison with George 
Mason.28  During the drafting of the Virginia Declaration of Rights in 1776, Madison 
persuaded Mason to amend the wording of the document from, “all men should enjoy the 
fullest toleration in the exercise of religion,”29  to the more liberty and rights minded 
wording of, “all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion.”30   
The difference was the word “free” which moved religion from the category of 
“legislative grace,”31 to an inalienable right through which everyone has “an absolute 
right to believe and worship a Supreme Being in his own way regardless of how the other 
man believes; or he may not believe at all.”32  By allowing the Supreme Court to 
establish judicial review of religious actions, to define religious symbols,33 and to define 
what is and is not religious in nature, facets of an individual or groups religious practices 
have become what Madison and other Founding Fathers set out to prevent; toleration of 
religion rather than the free exercise thereof.   
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Madison’s exchange with Mason laid the platform for his work on religious 
liberty, culminating in his 1785, penning of Memorial and Remonstrance against 
Religious Assessments,34 which advocated for religious freedom by espousing two 
fundamental principles.  The first and most important observation that Madison made 
was freedom “for religion rather than a Jeffersonian freedom from religion.”35  For 
Madison this idea meant that freedom of religion had to embrace more than mere 
opinion.36  In Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison stated that it was the right of every 
man to “exercise” his religion according to the dictate of his conscience.37  The second 
principle that Madison observed was the freedom for every individual “to embrace, to 
profess and to observe” whatever religion an individual believed to be of divine origin.38   
As a result of the Supreme Court’s inconsistency concerning religious issues, 
religion has become increasingly legislated; a situation that all the Founding Fathers 
wished to avoid.  Some recent examples that have blurred the lines between religious 
freedom and religious tolerance are the Affordable Care Act (2010), and the repeal of the 
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (1996), through the Supreme Court ruling of 
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. (2013).  The questions concerning the United States 
health care system, its faults, flaws and inadequacies are not the subject of debate.  The 
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principle question is, should the federal government impose upon an individual, and 
under certain circumstances their businesses,39 a law that according to their religious 
convictions is morally objectionable, and if not obeyed is subject to harsh penalties to the 
point of financial ruin?  Likewise, the debate surrounding the allegations of perceived 
civil rights abuses or the societal moral decline concerning same-sex relationships is not 
the subject of debate.  The principle question is, should the federal government force on 
individuals’ the acceptance and the facilitation of alternative lifestyle convictions if they 
contravene that individuals religious convictions?40     
According to Madison the answer to that question would be an unequivocal no.  
Although Madison’s religious convictions may have been at odds with the majority of 
Americans in the late eighteenth century, as a drafter of the Constitution, the Federalist 
Papers, and the Bill of Rights, his opinion on church and state affairs are relevant.  
Madison’s primary focus concerning religious issues was keeping the government out of 
religion as opposed to the more modern understanding of keeping religion out of 
government.  Madison believed that both the state and federal legislatures could not 
legislate, govern, or interfere with religious opinion or practices because it was the 
dictates of a man’s conscience and convictions.41  The reason Madison opposed the 
drafting of the Bill of Rights was because he believed that “power over religion was not 
given to the government but rather reserved to the people themselves.”42  According to 
                                                 
39 Ethan Bronner, “A Flood of Suits Fights Coverage of Birth Control,” New York Times, 
January 26, 2013. 
40 Rachel Zoll, “Divide over religious exemptions over gay marriage,” Times-Standard, 
September 7, 2013; Cheryl K. Chumley, “Christian bakers who refused cake order for 
gay wedding forced to close shop,” The Washington Times, September 2, 2013.  
41 Wilson, Church and State, 72. 
42 Curry, Farewell to Christendom, 11. 
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Madison, local, state, and federal government did not possess even “the shadow of right” 
to meddle in religion.43  Madison argued that, “the same authority which can force a 
citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any establishment, 
may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever.”44  The 
jurisprudence established by the Supreme Court concerning issues of religion has 
deviated from Madison, and many of the other Founding Fathers, insights and 
understanding.  By the early twenty-first century, although the federal government cannot 
force a person to financially support religion through taxation, it can force an individual 
to support an “other establishment” against their religious convictions.  
Forcing an individual or an organization to act in a manner contrary to their 
religious convictions contravenes both the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses of the 
First Amendment.  It could be argued that, in accordance with the precedence set through 
Van Orden v. Perry, people could be exempt from participating in or adhering to such 
laws if they can show clear historical precedence to support their religious convictions.  
While this precedence may seem like an amicable compromise, the real constitutional 
concern is that the federal government is prohibiting a person from what Madison 
referred to as their “inalienable right.”  Denying anyone this “inalienable right” the 
federal government has established what Madison fought against during the drafting of 
the 1776, Virginia Declaration of Rights.45   By allowing an individual to be exempt from 
national laws and statutes the federal government has moved away from “all men are 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Wilson, Church and State, 69. 
45 Meacham, American Gospel, 69. 
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equally entitled to the free exercise of religion,”46 to “toleration in the exercise of 
religion,” thereby moving religious conviction and practices into the category of 
“legislative grace.”   
Historians and scholars have offered solutions and compromises to help solve the 
judicial impasse before the Court.  Unfortunately, nothing to date has provided an 
amicable solution to the thorny problems presented by the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses.  This examination of six Supreme Court cases highlights the current 
jurisprudential thicket.  It is concerning that despite seventy years of jurisprudence the 
Supreme Court has been unable to formulate a consistent and durable solution to the 
religion clauses.  Even more concerning is the path which Supreme Court jurisprudence 
has found itself taking where religious freedom has become confused with religious 
tolerance.  Until the justices of the United States Supreme Court decide upon a principle 
consistent with both the historical and legal jurisprudence of the First Amendment, 
religious cases will continue to languish in flux between religious freedom and religious 
toleration, unable to find an equitable place in modern American society.
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